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ACCOUNT RECOVERY METHODS FOR TWO-FACTOR AUTHENTICATION (2FA): AN 
EXPLORATORY STUDY 
 
Lauren Nicole Tiller  
Old Dominion University, 2020 
Director: Dr. Jeremiah D. Still 
System administrators have started to adopt two-factor authentication (2FA) to increase 
user account resistance to cyber-attacks. Systems with 2FA require users to verify their identity 
using a password and a second-factor authentication device to gain account access. This research 
found that 60% of users only enroll one second-factor device to their account. If a user’s second- 
factor becomes unavailable, systems are using different procedures to ensure its authorized 
owner recovers the account. Account recovery is essentially a bypass of the system’s main 
security protocols and needs to be handled as an alternative authentication process (Loveless, 
2018). The current research aimed to evaluate users’ perceived security for four 2FA account 
recovery methods. Using Renaud’s (2007) opportunistic equation, the present study determined 
that a fallback phone number recovery method provides user accounts with the most cyber-attack 
resistance followed by system-generated recovery codes, a color grid pattern, and graphical 
passcode. This study surveyed 103 participants about authentication knowledge, general risk 
perception aptitude, ability to correctly rank the recovery methods in terms of their attack-
resistance, and recovery method perceptions. Other survey inquires related to previous 2FA, 
account recovery, and cybersecurity training experiences. Participants generally performed 
poorly when asked to rank the recovery methods by security strength. Results suggested that 
neither risk numeracy, authentication knowledge, nor cybersecurity familiarity impacted users’ 
ability to rank recovery methods by security strength. However, the majority of participants 
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ranked either generated recovery codes, 39%, or a fallback phone number, 25%, as being most 
secure. The majority of participants, 45%, preferred the fallback phone number for account 
recovery, 38% expect it will be the easiest to use, and 46% expect it to be the most memorable. 
However, user’s annotative descriptions for recovery method preferences revealed that users are 
likely to disregard the setup instructions and use their phone number instead of an emergency 
contact number. Overall, this exploratory study offers information that researchers and designers 
can deploy to improve user’s 2FA- and 2FA account recovery- experiences. 
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The most common form of authentication is the single-factor alphanumeric password (Leu, 
2017; Zyiran & Haga, 1999). When users are asked to login to a system, they typically verify 
their identity by authenticating with “something they are” (e.g., fingerprint), “something they 
know” (e.g., password), or “something they have” (e.g., Swipe card; Grassie, Garcia, & Fenton, 
2017). When it comes to knowledge-based authentication, users bear the responsibility of 
creating strong passwords to ensure the security of their online accounts (Cain & Still, 2018). 
The security requirements for creating a strong password are cumbersome (Ashford, 2009; 
Barton & Barton, 1984; Hoonakker, Bornoe, & Carayon, 2009; Labuschagne, Veerasamy, 
Burke, & Eloff, 2011). To overcome these cognitive burdens, users often produce passwords that 
reflect common patterns or strategies that are easy to recall, which may reduce their account’s 
resistance to cyber-attacks. To increase account security and to compensate for weak or insecure 
account protection provided by traditional alphanumeric passwords, some companies (e.g., 
Microsoft, Google, and Facebook) have started to offer or require their users adopt two-factor 
authentication (Reese, 2018).  
Two-Factor (or Multi-Factor) Authentication (2FA or MFA) is a layered authentication 
process that requires the user to couple their password with another type of authentication 
method. In 2018, federal agencies that use dot-gov domains such as the Department of Justice 
began to prompt officials to add the two-factor security feature to increase the system’s intruder 
attack resistance (Shaban, 2018). However, in the event of a failed second-factor device, 
regaining account access can be problematic for the authorized user (Tellini & Vargas, 2017). 
Essentially, when the authentication process is more secure, more information is needed to prove 
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the user’s identity. As a result, regaining account access becomes more difficult (Tellini & 
Vargas, 2017).  
The password reset procedure for systems that only use a single-factor password is 
different from the 2FA account recovery processes. Renaud (2007), noted that systems using 
single-factor password authentication fulfill password reset requests by either asking the user to 
answer a particular question, emailing the user their forgotten password, or emailing the user a 
secure link that obliges the user to create a new password. The account recovery process for 
systems that implement 2FA is more complex. Even though passwords may be involved, account 
recovery is not the same as a basic password reset (Loveless, 2018). Systems implementing 2FA 
require extra steps to ensure that an account is recovered to its rightful owner. Account recovery 
procedures are essentially a bypass of the system’s main security protocols, which necessitates 
systems to treat account recovery as an alternative authentication process (Loveless, 2018).  
A potential solution is to provide users with an account recovery method that is used as a 
failsafe for 2FA in the event of a lost, broken, stolen, or unavailable second factor. The purpose 
of an account recovery method is to maintain the high cyber-attack resistance while still allowing 
the authorized user account access. There is limited research that evaluates different types of 
2FA account recovery method options. In this thesis, we explored the qualities that allow account 
recovery methods to maintain adequate attack resistance while still permitting account access to 
the authorized user. We measured the objective and subjective security of four different 2FA 
account recovery methods. We aimed to gain a comprehensive understanding of the typical end 
user’s knowledge of concepts and threats associated with authentication and to measure 
individual differences of general risk perception, and account recovery methods preference.  
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1.1 Cyber-Attack Threats and Authentication  
There were an estimated 82,000 reported cybersecurity attacks occurring at businesses around 
the world in 2016 (Smith, Wilbur, & Spiezle, 2018). This estimate almost doubled to 159,700 by 
2017 (Smith et al., 2018). Researchers identified weak passwords as a critical source of security 
failure within the infrastructure of a system (Cazier & Medlin, 2006; Dawson & Stinebaugh, 
2010). Cone, Thompson, Irvine, and Nguyen (2006) found that users put their accounts at risk by 
creating weak passwords or leaving their computers logged in. However, cybersecurity attacks 
are an issue for any authentication infrastructure. Brute force, social engineering, intersection, 
and Over-the-Shoulder (OSA) are several cybersecurity attack techniques commonly deployed to 
overcome authentication schemes. 
 
1.1.1 Brute Force Cyber-attacks 
Brute force attacks are a common threat to alphanumeric passwords. A brute force attack occurs 
when an attacker inputs multiple password combinations until they gain access (English & Poet, 
2012). To increase brute force attack resistance, users are often encouraged to create passwords 
that are complex and memorable (Hoonakker et al., 2009; Labuschagne et al., 2011); changed 
often (Barton & Barton, 1984); remain secret (Hoonakker et al., 2009); and differ for each 
account (Ashford, 2009; Barton & Barton, 1984; Hoonakker et al., 2009). Strong passwords 
should be comprised of long character strings (Florêncio, Herley, & Coskun, 2007); include 
upper- and lower- case letters, special characters, numbers, punctuation, and non-dictionary 
words (Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, 2009; Yale, 2007). Despite the 
exhaustive list of strong password suggestions and requirements, research has shown that 31% of 
users use the same passwords for all accounts, and 43% of users have never changed their 
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password (Infosecurity Europe, 2008). Still, Cain, and Schuster (2017) highlighted that the 
recommended practices for strong password creation lead to users creating passwords that are 
not memorable and will ultimately force users to invent cognitive workarounds.  
The task of recalling a complex alphanumeric password can be cognitively demanding 
due to human memory limitations (Boechler, 2006). The cognitive science research of Sweller 
(1988) introduced the cognitive load theory, which suggests that the human mind is analogous to 
an information processing system with working- and storage- memory. Hogg (2007) reiterated 
that working memory is limited and defined cognitive load as “the processing of information that 
occurs in working memory” (p. 188). Previous research has also suggested that security behavior 
practices exhibited by users are directly impacted by their cognitive limitations (Conklin, 
Dietrich, & Walz, 2004). Conklin et al. (2004) used models to depict how a user’s need for a 
password memory aid gets intensified as the number of passwords for different accounts rises. 
Additionally, their results advocate that it is difficult for users to simultaneously adhere to all the 
password security recommendations for multiple systems due to fundamental cognitive memory 
limitations (Conklin et al., 2004).  
To reduce the inherent cognitive burdens of strong password “rules,” authentication 
scheme designers created graphical passcode schemes. Graphical authentication schemes take 
advantage of the fact that users can make more meaningful associations with the images 
(Madigan, 1983; Paivio, 2013). The visual features composing the graphical passcode help 
memorability by supporting richer encoding. For instance, the graphical authentication scheme, 
Passpoints, allows users to click on specific points within a picture (Wiedenbeck, Waters, Birget, 
Brodskiy, & Memon, 2005). The graphical scheme, Use Your Illusion (UYI), tasks users with 
recognizing a distorted target image from a set of distorted distractor images (Hayashi, Dhamija, 
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Christin, & Perrig, 2008; Cain & Still, 2018). Another cognitive benefit of deploying a graphical 
authentication scheme for account recovery is the employment of recognition rather than recall 
memory retrieval. For example, asking users to recognize their password features in front of 
them rather than having to recall their password from memory (c.f., Tulving & Watkins, 1973).  
However, the employment of graphical authentication comes at the cost of new 
cyberattack vectors. Visual passcodes used in a shared space can afford other nearby easy access 
to the passcode at a glance. Thus, graphical schemes have emerged to prevent Over-the-Shoulder 
Attacks (OSAs). For instance, some use gaze-based input where users select their passcode 
targets using their eyes (De Luca, Denzel, & Hussmann, 2009). Other graphical schemes like 
What You See is What You Enter (WYSWYE; Khot, Kumaraguru, & Srinathan, 2012) and 
Explore-a-Nation (EaN; Tiller, Angelini, Leibner, & Still, 2019) involve translating the graphical 
target information to another location. 
 
1.1.2 Social Engineering Cyber-Attacks 
When users create passwords or select graphical passcode images that pertain to personal 
preferences, an attacker could produce an educated guess through social engineering attacks. For 
example, an attacker can research a user to gather useful personal information (e.g., interest, 
heritage) and later use the data to determine what images might have been selected for the 
passcode. Researchers of alphanumeric passwords reiterated the need for users to create strong 
passwords to prevent social engineering attacks (Ashford, 2009; Barton & Barton, 1984; Choong 
& Greene, 2016; Coventry, Briggs, Jeske, & van Moorsel, 2014; Cox, Connolly, & Currall, 
2001; Konieczny, Trias, & Taylor, 2015; Pelgrin, 2014).  
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1.1.3 Intersection and Over-the-Shoulder Cyber-Attacks 
Graphical authentication schemes have also been criticized for their vulnerability to intersection 
attacks. This type of cyber-attack occurs when an attacker takes multiple video recordings of a 
user logging in, then cross-references the recordings to discriminate targets from distractors 
(English & Poet, 2012). For graphical authentication schemes to increase intersection attack 
resistance, schemes should consistently deploy the target images amongst the same distractor 
images (Gao, Liu, Dai, Wang, & Chang, 2009; Renaud 2007). As a result, the discriminability of 
the targets and distractors becomes more challenging for attackers.  
The most common cyber-attack threat to graphical authentication schemes is their 
susceptibility to OSAs, also referred to as shoulder surfing. To determine the amount of 
resistance a given graphical scheme provides to prevent these types of observation attacks, 
previous researchers have evaluated participant performance when asked to take an attacker role 
(Cain & Still, 2016; 2018; De Luca, Hertzschuch, & Hussmann, 2010; Sun, Chen, Yeh, & 
Cheng, 2016; Tiller et al., 2019; Zangooei, Mansoori, & Welch, 2012). Research conducted by 
Cain and Still (2018) established that four OSA defense strategies are commonly deployed (i.e., 
disguising the appearance of targets, grouping the targets among distractors, using gaze-based 
input, or translating targets to another location). Their results suggested that graphical schemes 
that implement translating targets to another location- or grouping- strategies provide more 
resistance to OSAs (Cain & Still, 2018).  
Renaud (2007) also highlighted that each type of authentication scheme potentially offers 
different levels of security against cyber-attacks. The “user” authentication step for accessing a 
system is the component of the system where the system administrator maintains limited control. 
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However, system designers can choose different authentication schemes based on organization 
preference, user’s needs, and target level of security. 
 
1.1.4 Cyber-Attack Resistance and Authentication Scheme Selection 
An opportunistic score is a tool that can help system designers make better decisions when 
selecting the best authentication scheme from a subset of options. Renaud’s (2007) formula can 
calculate an opportunistic score for a given authentication mechanism. The level of attack 
resistance that is necessary to protect users’ accounts is unique to each system. Essentially, some 
authentication schemes provide greater attack resistance, but they may place a more significant 
cognitive burden on the user or reflect lower authentication success rates. Renaud (2007) 
provides a process that guides designers in their choice and development of web authentication. 
Her procedure is risk-aware, considers the user’s needs, asset value, and the impact of possible 
account intrusion. For instance, a system designer may seek to use an authentication scheme that 
offers both high security and usable qualities. If a designer wants to choose between viable 
authentication options, an opportunistic score for each scheme can be calculated to determine 
which scheme is best for narrowing an attacker’s window of opportunity to complete a 
successful attack. The extent to which the authentication scheme’s guessability, observability, 
recordability, and analyzability can be exploited will determine how difficult it will be for an 
attacker to penetrate the system. These four authentication weaknesses are components of the 
opportunistic score. The score itself is a summed function of the subcomponents of the four 
weaknesses divided by the systems resistibility (see Figure 1). 
 




Opportunistic Score Formula Presented by Renaud (2007) 
 
 
Guessability is traditionally measured as potential password strength. For example, each 
guess of a four-digit pin has a 1 in 10,000 chance of being correct, which is a strong mechanism 
to prevent unauthorized attacks. However, users must beware not to select a PIN that relates to 
personally identifiable information (e.g., date of significant events like birth or wedding). 
Observability refers to whether or not the passcode can be directly observed, a risk that is often 
associated with shoulder surfing attacks. Recordability relates to the risk associated with users 
telling others their password or writing it down. Renaud (2007) further highlighted the need for 
the designer to consider prevalently used electronic functions such as a print screen or screen 
record. On the other hand, a gaze-based password cannot be recorded even if those functions are 
utilized. Analyzability is related to the software vulnerabilities that can be exploited by an 
attacker. This component helps designers detect software risks that could make the system more 
vulnerable. For example, a system that requires unique usernames is less vulnerable to cyber-
attacks than systems that use email addresses as usernames. However, the opportunity for the 
software risk factors to become apparent during an attack can be constrained by the system's 
resistibility. A system’s attack resistibility could be increased by limiting the number of 
inaccurate login-attempts or sending a user an SMS notification whenever their account has been 
accessed. Aside from making the right system authentication security design decisions, 
administrators should also educate the end-users about better authentication practices and habits 
to help diminish the risk that comes from their authentication choices (Still et al., 2017). The 
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current research calculated the opportunistic score for each account recovery method to 
determine their cyber-attack resistance. In addition to calculating the opportunistic score 
associated with a given account recovery method, we considered the knowledge, behaviors, and 
general risk perception abilities of typical end-users. 
 
1.2 The Importance of User Assessments 
For users to practice good information security habits during authentication, some knowledge is 
required. One way to establish end-user’s knowledge level and common authentication practices 
is to use surveys. Markelj and Bernik (2015) used a questionnaire to examine awareness of- and 
behaviors towards- security threats specific to mobile phones. They found that the most common 
form of protection used on mobile phones was authentication, with the majority indicating they 
use a PIN passcode (Markelj & Bernik, 2015). However, 56.8% of participants specified that 
they did not use any authentication (Markelj & Bernik, 2015).  
Gratian, Bandi, Cukier, Dykstra, and Ginther (2018) used a survey to examine how 
characteristics of decision-making styles, risk-taking, conscientiousness, and gender predicted 
cybersecurity behavior intentions. One of their research findings suggested that individual 
differences influence password generation intentions. More specifically, the results indicated that 
women generate weaker passwords than men. For the demographics of established major, 
participants who reported an engineering major were more likely to create stronger passwords 
than those with a humanities major (Gratian et al., 2018). Additionally, participants who had an 
avoidant decision-making style were more inclined to generate strong passwords (Gratian et al., 
2018). 
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Cain, Edwards, and Still (2018) conducted an extensive study to evaluate users’ cyber 
hygiene knowledge of threats, concepts, and behaviors by examining cyber topics such as 
authentication, security software, social networking, web browsing, USB drive use, phishing 
scams, and Wi-Fi hotspot usage. Their results indicated that people 45 years of age and older 
generally practice more secure cyber behaviors. Cyber hygiene knowledge did not differ by age. 
However, males had more knowledge than females. Despite having more knowledge, males and 
females had no difference in security behaviors. Another finding of their study suggested that 
users who were a victim of past cyber-attacks reported behaviors and knowledge that did not 
differ from users who had not been subjected to a cyber-attack. Interestingly, the survey results 
showed that participants who indicated they had received past cybersecurity training had less 
knowledge and more risky behaviors than users who reported they had not received training. 
They found that 81% of their participants (n = 144) had received some form of cybersecurity 
training. Other research studies that evaluated the proportion of self-identified cybersecurity 
trained participants found much lower results (19% for college-age students; Aytes & Conolly, 
2003; 43% for adults; National Cyber Security Alliance, 2010). The current research used some 
of the general authentication knowledge, demographic, and behavior questions from Cain et al. 
(2018) and adapted some of the Renaud (2007) opportunistic score categories to create a 
comprehensive survey to establish user’s general concept- and threat- authentication knowledge. 
 
1.2.1 User’s Risk Perception Abilities and Related Behaviors 
Risk perception and behaviors are also important individual difference factors that should be 
considered for cybersecurity and general authentication practices. For instance, Van Schaik et al. 
(2017) examined how risk perceptions (e.g., the severity of risk) lead to protective behaviors for 
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installing updates, using antivirus, and using firewalls. Their results indicated that feelings of 
control and severity of consequences were good risk perceptions categories for predicting good 
precautionary behavior (Van Schaik et al., 2017). Another survey indicated that users who have 
propensities towards risk-taking or are conscientious create weaker passwords (Gratian et al., 
2018). 
The National Institute of Standards and Technology defines risk as, the net negative 
impact that results from a vulnerability issue after accounting for the probability- and the impact- 
of the occurrence (Grassie et al., 2017). This study assessed risk from a cognitive perspective and 
evaluated decision making in terms of user’s risk perception abilities. Risk perception is a critical 
component of risk behavior. More specifically, risk perception is the user’s (a.k.a., the decision-
maker) assessment of risk inherent in the given situation (Department of Homeland Security 
Federal Infrastructure Protection Bureau [DHS-IP], 2013). When a user conducts a risk 
assessment, they account for both the perceived magnitude and probability of the risk (DHS-IP, 
2013). Risk perception is influenced by the risk assessment process and individual differences.  
Previous research studies have pointed to the importance of establishing end-users 
general risk assessment abilities. An empirical study conducted by Pattinson (2012) evaluated 
how users’ risk perceptions and their behavior when working with a computer impacted their 
organization’s Information Security (IS). The study used a Repertory Grid Technique (RGT) as 
an interviewing instrument to elicit IS risk perceptions of computer users (Pattinson, 2012). 
More specifically, the research examined individual differences in users’ IS risk perception 
according to the user’s gender, organizational level, and InfoSec awareness level. One finding 
suggested that the higher the organizational position that is held by the user, the more concern 
they will have for the organization risks rather than their risks (Pattinson, 2012). Another finding 
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indicated that female computer users have a more balanced view of IS risks but do not view the 
damage to their organization’s reputation as a serious risk (Pattinson, 2012).  
Another study conducted by Sharit et al. (2014) established the role that graph literacy, 
health literacy, and numeracy abilities had in enabling veterans to perform tasks using My 
HealtheVet (MHV) system (c.f., the Department of Veteran Affairs’ Personal Health Record 
Portal). Notably, the research conducted by Sharit et al. (2014) used the Berlin Numeracy Test 
(BNT) to establish a veteran’s risk numeracy abilities. The results indicated that higher task 
performance could be differentiated from a lower performance by age, health literacy, graph 
literacy, and BNT scores (Sharit et al., 2014). They found that veterans with little computer 
proficiency skills whom are older and had results reflecting low health literacy, graph literacy, 
and BNT scores are at a disadvantage and are subject to miss out on the health management 
benefits that are provided by the MHV system (Sharit et al., 2014). 
Research on risk decision making has highlighted the importance of user’s statistical 
numeracy abilities (e.g., comparing and transforming proportions and probabilities) for making 
informed and accurate risk decisions regarding numerical and non-numerical information 
(Cokely, Galesic, Schulz, Ghazal, & Garcia-Retamero, 2012; Lipkus, Samsa, & Rimer, 2001; 
Schwartz, Woloshin, Black, & Welch, 1997). According to Cokely et al. (2012), the BNT was 
created to measure risk literacy, which they defined as “the range of statistical numeracy skill 
that is important for accurately interpreting and acting on information about risk” (p. 37). Cokely 
et al. (2012) presented 21 research studies that were conducted across 15 countries to assess the 
convergent, criterion, and discriminant validity of the BNT. One study compared the BNT to 
other numeracy tests developed by Schwartz et al. (1997) and Lipkus et al. (2001) to establish 
the BNTs criterion validity. The results demonstrated when holding constant the two alternate 
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strongest predictors of performance (e.g., cognitive reflection and fluid intelligence), the BNT 
significantly predicted the additional unique variance in risk understanding (Cokely et al., 2012). 
The two other numeracy tests (e.g., Schwartz et al., 1997 and Lipkus et al., 2001) lost their risk 
literacy predictive power when the cognitive intelligence or reflection tests were added to a 
hierarchical regression model (Cokely et al., 2012). The results suggested that the BNT is a 
psychometrically sound instrument that quickly assesses risk literacy and statistical numeracy 
abilities to help distinguish between educated individuals (Cokely et al., 2012, 2018). 
The BNT has broad predictive power regarding individual performance differences for 
both numerical and non-numerical risk decision tasks (Cokely et al., 2012, 2018). Cokely et al. 
(2018) rationalized that statistical numeracy tests like the BNT are robust because, “effective 
decision making in our complex and uncertain world often requires the same kinds of reasoning 
and metacognitive skills (e.g., evaluating thinking, feelings, and risks) that are used when solving 
various practical probabilistic math problems” (p. 479). Effective, naturalistic decision making is 
primarily about using personally meaningful and practical inductive reasoning and self-
regulation for contemplating risk and uncertainty (Cokely et al., 2018). The cognitive processes 
required for numeracy test questions are more analogous to the processes used for effective 
naturalistic risk decision making when compared to the mental processes utilized for other 
cognitive ability tests (Cokely et al., 2018).  
The current study used the BNT to establish the relations between the end-user’s general 
risk literacy and their perception of the security provided by different 2FA recovery methods. 
Research conducted by Nurse, Creese, Goldsmith, and Lamberts (2011) suggested that 
individuals with high-numeracy levels are more likely to attend to risk information while 
individuals with low-numeracy levels are more likely to draw on expert guidance and emotions. 
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It is common for researchers to use the BNT as a general risk literacy tool in studies that provide 
domain-specific numbers or probabilities that can be associated with risk (Sharit et al., 2014; 
Woller-Carter, Okan, Cokely, & Garcia-Retamero, 2012). In the context of authentication, it is 
not common for companies to provide the probability of a successful attack for a given scheme. 
Instead of this, it is essential to establish how the risk information for the different 2FA account 
recovery methods should be communicated in the current study.  
 
1.2.2 Communication of Cybersecurity Risks 
It is crucial to consider the best practices for communicating cybersecurity risk information to 
promote informed judgment. Nurse et al. (2011) examined the methods used for effectively 
expressing cybersecurity risks and proposed a list of recommendations. Nurse et al. (2011) noted 
that the use of visual aids is a popular method for formatting risk-communication information. 
They emphasized that the effectiveness of a visual varies based on the context of the application. 
Each risk communication presentation format (e.g., textual, visual, numeric) has unique strengths 
and weaknesses in facilitating productive risk communication information (Chen et al., 2018; 
Nurse et al., 2011). If the research situation allows, a combination of different presentation 
formats can also be used (Chen et al., 2018; Nurse et al., 2011). When communicating risks, 
Nurse et al. (2011) suggested presenting non-cybersecurity experts with a limited amount of 
security details to keep the communication simple and reduce cognitive load. At the same time, 
researchers should provide representative information when the risk perception task requires 
users to make educated judgments (Almuhimedi et al., 2015; Chen et al., 2018; Nurse et al., 
2011).  
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The current research hoped to shed light on how risk literacy relates to cybersecurity risk 
perception of different 2FA account recovery methods. One section of our study provided users 
with textual and visual information for each 2FA account recovery method. The goal was to 
provide enough information about each method that would allow users with knowledge about the 
different cybersecurity authentication attack vectors (e.g., brute force, intersection) to accurately 
determine how secure a given method is in comparison to the other methods. For example, each 
recovery method description contained information regarding the number of password characters 
(or passcode images) that need to be input in order to successfully authenticate (see Appendix A 
– section 5). Tentatively, if the participant understands passwords or passcodes that are short 
and/or lack complexity are more susceptible to brute force attacks, they should have been able to 
determine which method is most secure by comparison. Combining all the attack vector 
information that could have been deducted for the 2FA account recovery textual and visual 
excerpts (c.f., password length, password can be easily recorded, an attacker would only need 
one observation to obtain the full password) should have allowed for users to correctly rank 
order the methods in terms of their security.  
The current research had users rank the 2FA account recovery methods in terms of 
security. This task allowed us to indirectly test whether users understood the different attack 
vectors. This was an integral part of the study because if a participant does well on the BNT, but 
not well on the comprehension and ranking tasks, it is probable they may not know enough about 
cybersecurity authentication information. The results will guide suggestions for future efforts 
regarding the best ways of presenting information to improve cybersecurity authentication 
comprehension and authentication selection. 
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Theoretically, if users have high-risk literacy, are aware of the authentication risks, and 
practice good authentication hygiene, then cyber-attack resistance potentially increases. 
Opposingly, when users practice poor password hygiene (e.g., reusing passwords across multiple 
accounts, creating easily cracked passwords), they are inherently more susceptible to cyber-
attacks (Ur et al., 2015). The risks associated with poor password habits are further compound by 
events like a hacker exposing a company’s password database. According to McCandless (2019), 
there has been a large number of reported database breaches where passwords for system users 
were leaked. With the increased risk of having authentication credentials compromised due to 
massive data breaches, more organizations are offering two-factor authentication (McCandless, 
2019).  
 
1.3 Two-Factor Authentication (2FA) 
In 2016, the United States Federal Government passed a law titled the Federal Cybersecurity 
Enhancement Act. The bill specified that agencies with “elevated privilege” personnel accounts 
were required to use multi-factor authentication for all the accounts with said, “elevated 
privileges” (Federal Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2016). The 2FA authentication process 
prompts users to provide identity verifying information for two different authentication 
categories (c.f., something you know, something you have, or something you are). One type of 
2FA example is performing a grocery store transaction using the Point Of Sale (POS) Machine, 
the user inputs a debit card (something they have) and inputs a PIN (something they know). The 
idea is that each different category of authentication type requires different attacker capabilities 
and various kinds of attack strategies, which in turn increases the user’s account security. 
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However, 2FA for computer systems is a relatively new concept that many large companies have 
started to offer or require users to adopt. 
 
1.3.1 Second Factor Mechanisms  
Standard practice has the first factor remaining the user’s password for operating systems that 
enable 2FA. The second factor is often something that the user has. For instance, a common 2FA 
platform is Duo Mobile Application (App), which is essentially an App the user downloads on 
their device that is also linked to their system account (Duo, 2019). When the user reaches the 
second-factor stage during authentication for the given account, they can either choose to receive 
a push notification from the App or have the App generate a one-time code for the user to type-in 
to authenticate. If the user opts to receive a push notification, the user will be required to approve 
the login action. If the user selects the “reject” push notification option, the authentication 
attempt will be blocked (Loveless, 2018).  
Another Universal Second Factor (U2F) is in the form of a USB thumb drive, for 
example, the Yubico Security Key, which is an implementation of Fast Identity Online (FIDO; 
Srinivas, Balfanz, Tiffany, & Czeskis, 2017). The Yubico security key communicates with the 
system via a USB stick that has a built-in touch sensor that the user must touch to authenticate 
(Lang, Czeskis, Balfanz, Schilder, & Srinivas, 2017). A one-button hardware token is also a 
primary FIDO 2FA device a user might physically possess. After a hardware token is registered 
to a user’s account, pushing the button will generate a time-based (TOTP) or hash-based (HOTP) 
one-time (6- or 8- digit) passcode that is only valid for a limited amount of time (Goldberg, 
2018). Similarly, users can also opt to receive a one-time passcode by downloading 2FA 
software on to a personal computer. For example, our university offers WinAuth to faculty and 
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students as an option for obtaining a software-generated code as their second factor (ODU 
Information Technology Services, 2019). WinAuth is an open-source authenticator software for 
Windows that generates time-based codes like that of hardware tokens (Mackie, 2017). Despite 
the extra layer of security provided by 2FA to increase the infrastructure of the system’s attack 
resistance, the 2FA usability research findings revealed a mixture of strengths and weaknesses 
regarding the 2FA processes and devices (Colnago et al., 2018; Das, Dingman, & Camp, 2018). 
 
1.3.2 User Studies Surrounding 2FA  
Das et al. (2018) conducted research that compared user acceptance of the USB Yubico keys 
(e.g., YubiKey 4, YubiKey 4 Nano, YubiKey 4C, and YubiKey NEO) in a two-part study. They 
gathered users’ usability and acceptability data both before and after interface interactions 
modifications were made to improve usability. Despite the Yubico improvements, the second 
study revealed that participants continued to express their belief in password strength alone. 
They concluded their study with a warning that stated, “Even the best-designed hardware will 
not be used if the benefits are not apparent” (Das et al., 2018, p. 15).  
Colnago et al. (2018) explored the behaviors and opinions of 2FA adoption at Carnegie 
Mellon University (CMU). The results indicated that users believed it provided their account 
with more security, and it was reasonably easy to use. However, many noted that 2FA was 
annoying. Additionally, they found that users' experience with the CMU Duo App led to positive 
perceptions. The issues associated with the Duo mobile App were also evaluated. Interestingly, 
the results indicated that users commonly reported problems such as forgetting one’s second 
factor, having it too far away, losing one’s phone, having a dead phone battery, having no data 
connection, and the hardware token desynchronizing. They noted that the frequency of users 
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experiencing any of the aforementioned problems significantly impacted both the usability and 
security constructs. The user’s perceptions were negatively affected as the frequency of the 
issues increased. When these problems occurred, users reported consequences such as not being 
able to do homework and participate in class; not having access to one’s email or computer 
system; not having access to one’s dorm or office; and the interruption of a current task.  
 
1.3.3 2FA Account Recovery 
In emergencies where 2FA issues prevent the authorized user from gaining account access, an 
alternate account recovery option that does not require a registered device or downloaded 
software should be available to users. Essentially, an account recovery authentication option is 
an account feature that some systems with 2FA make available for users to set up before losing a 
second-factor device. Some organizations with 2FA (e.g., Reddit, GitHub, and Google) are 
currently offering precautionary account recovery options (Loveless, 2018; Prins, 2018; Wallen, 
2018). Other websites such as Apple, Evernote, Twitter, and Coinbase inform account holders 
that in the event of a lost second factor, it may take several business days to regain account 
access (Afonin, 2016; Coinbase Support – Account Management, n.d.; Ravenscraft, 2014). To 
regain account access to a LinkedIn account when the second factor is unavailable, the user is 
required to complete a multi-part form and submit a copy of a government-issued ID (Loveless, 
2018). 
Several recovery options are used by website systems when users need to regain account 
assess. Loveless (2018) conducted an informal exploratory evaluation of authentication practices 
for 2FA and 2FA account recovery for several websites (e.g., Facebook, Amazon, Apple ID, 
GitHub, Reddit, Yahoo, Twitter, LinkedIn, Gmail, Kraken, Live, and Coinbase). The article 
covered several recovery options that are used by organizations, which include backup email or 
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phone, backup recovery codes, offsite or downloadable codes, Master Key (passwords), and a 
valid government ID. None of the companies that were evaluated provided users with all of the 
recovery options. 
One secure account recovery method is a fallback phone number that allows users to 
specify a phone number where a special access code can be received (Loveless, 2018). Some 
websites provide users with the option to have the code sent to the emergency contact via text or 
phone call. Loveless (2018) reported that GitHub was the only website that allowed a fallback 
phone number to be used as an account recovery option if the 2FA device failed. However, 
GitHub did not prompt users to enter an emergency contact number instead of their phone 
number (GitHub Help, 2019). Presumably, if the account holder’s phone is unavailable, the 
mobile app for 2FA cannot be used, and they will be denied account access. If the user sets up 
their phone number as the fallback number and their phone is not accessible, the fallback 
recovery system is also rendered useless, and the user would still be without immediate account 
access.  
The Coinbase website only allowed a backup phone number as account recovery if the 
account holder was using SMS-based 2FA (Loveless, 2018). Alternatively, so it seems, even if a 
user adds a second phone number to their account as an account recovery option, Coinbase does 
not provide the user with the option to select which account recovery phone number receives the 
SMS 2FA recovery code (Coinbase Support – Account Management, n.d.). If the user follows 
the link “unable to submit a one-time code” the only options given to the user are “I no longer 
own the phone ending in +x xxx xxx xx01” or “cancel sign-in” (Coinbase Support – Account 
Management, n.d.). If the user follows the “no longer owns phone” option, the user is advised 
that account recovery could take 48-72 hours (Coinbase Support – Account Management, n.d.). 
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Additionally, users are informed that they will need to: recall and input the old phone number 
associated with the account; provide the system with their new number; send in a valid and 
current form of ID; and take a selfie to accompany the ID being sent (Coinbase Support – 
Account Management, n.d.). 
An ideal way to implement a fallback phone number as an account recovery option is for 
the system to instruct the user to provide an emergency contact phone number (e.g., significant 
other, family member) during their initial setup of 2FA. When this account recovery option is 
used, the user could be asked to accurately recognize and select the last four digits of the number 
that corresponds to their emergency contact’s phone number (e.g., ***-***-9540) from a set of 
distractor phone number endings or asked to recall the last four digits from memory. According 
to Wickelgren and Norman (1966), users are better at performing recognition tasks than recall 
tasks. They propose that recognition over recall is a major tenet of good design and is explained 
well by the Strength Theory. This theory highlights the fact that recall and recognition involve 
the same memory task but proposes that recognition requires a lower threshold of strength. Thus, 
accomplishing the memory task becomes easier because recognition necessitates less cognitive 
resources. 
Generated account recovery codes are another secure account recovery method. Account 
recovery codes are often provided when the user enables 2FA on their account (Loveless, 2018). 
The recovery codes (e.g., WHZ-23156) are generated by the system and are unique for each user. 
When recovery codes are provided, it is common for the system to prompt the user to remember 
the codes; save the codes to an offline server or encrypt the file; or print a hardcopy and store it 
in a safe place (Loveless, 2018; GitHub Help, 2019). When a user attempts to recover the 
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account, the system will ask the user to input one of their account recovery codes (GitHub Help, 
2019). 
A color grid pattern is another type of account recovery method. During the initial setup, 
users are asked to create a pattern of colors on a 3x3 grid that they will be able to remember and 
recreate (see Figure 2). At setup, the user chooses the colors they want to use from a system 
provided color pallet and create a pattern on the grid. The system requires that the user chooses 
at least two different colors. During account recovery, users are prompted to recreate their color 
pattern on the grid (MIDAS & Monarch-Key, 2019). Similar to the color grid pattern, another 




Color Grid Pattern Used for Account Recovery 
 
 
In general, graphical passcodes provide users with a system-generated set of three to five 
picture icons that are assigned as the user’s passcode icons (CHC; Wiedenbeck, Waters, Sobrado, 
& Birget, 2006; UYI; Hayashi et al., 2008; WYSWYE; Khot et al., 2012; EaN; Tiller et al., 
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2019). During the user’s initial interaction with the authentication scheme, they are instructed to 
remember their unique set of icons. For the account recovery, the user will be asked to recognize 
and select their target passcode icons from a set of distractor icons. Note that the order in which 
users select their icons during login often does not matter. Theoretically, account recovery 
options will only be used intermittently. Therefore, it is important that the recovery method that 
an organization chooses is not only secure but also memorable.  
According to Shneiderman and Plaisant (2010), first-time users know the given task 
concept but lack knowledge of the interface. Expert users are identified as those who seek rapid 
task completion due to the familiarity of the task and concepts (Shneiderman & Plaisant, 2010). 
When authentication with a particular scheme is frequent, users can become experts 
(Shneiderman & Plaisant, 2010). On the other hand, some tasks only require intermittent 
authentication (e.g., taxes or account recovery). When a system is not used for a long time, the 
user can forget significant portions of what they knew, thus becoming an intermediate user 
(Cooper, Reimann, & Cronin, 2007). This is likely to be the case for authentication recovery 
schemes since there will often be an elapsed period between the initial setup and the actual 
application of the account recovery method. Therefore, memorability needs to be an inherent 
feature of the account recovery method that is implemented. The current research deployed a 
survey question that addressed the memorability of the 2FA recovery methods from a 
metacognitive perspective. 
  
1.4 Needs Addressed by Current Research Study  
The overall research goal was to achieve a better understanding of what factors lead to a more 
secure account recovery by comparing the four different 2FA account recovery methods. We 
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examined end-users’ risk perception abilities and the authentication choices users make to secure 
their information. Ultimately, the results aid in determining which 2FA account recovery 
methods are perceived as secure, memorable, easy to use, and are preferred.  
This research looked at descriptive survey information. The survey aimed to evaluate the 
relations between what typical users know about general- and secure- authentication practices 
and their perception of account recovery. Individual participant differences and risk literacy were 
examined. We calculated the opportunistic score for each authentication recovery method to 
objectively rank the methods according to the level of security they provide. More specifically, 
we tested four critical hypotheses.  
First, we evaluated the Kendall’s tau correlations (1938) between the objective 
opportunistic rankings of the account recovery methods and user’s subjective security rankings 
of the account recovery methods for each participant. We expected that the tau correlation 
coefficients (rτ) that result from comparing objective and subjective account recovery security 
rankings would be less than rτ = .33, thus suggesting that the user’s comprehension of recovery 
method security is below optimal performance. Secondly, if there was variance in participant’s 
general risk literacy (BNT) scores, we predicted that there would be a positive relationship 
between user’s BNT score and their ability to correctly rank the recovery methods according to 
the amount of security they provide. For instance, we expected that participants who have a 
higher BNT score to generate fewer ranking discrepancies when they are asked to order the 
account recovery methods by their security. For the third hypothesis, we predicted that the 
average general concept- and threat- authentication knowledge score for individuals who indicate 
that they have received cybersecurity training would not be significantly different from the 
average score of those who indicate they have not received training. The fourth hypothesis 
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predicted that scores regarding general concept- and threat- authentication knowledge would be 
higher for males.  
In conjunction with the four hypotheses, other descriptive survey data were also explored. 
A general research inquiry examined whether or not the characteristics of experience with -2FA 
and -account recovery predicted secure account recovery method selection. We assessed whether 
or not having cybersecurity training impacted participant’s ability to rank account recovery 
methods by security strength. Lastly, we explored the relationship between a participant’s 
ranking ability and their overall authentication knowledge score. The survey allowed us to 
establish how users perceive account recovery methods. 





2.1 Participants  
A total of 113 undergraduate students (females = 78, males = 35) were recruited through the Old 
Dominion University (ODU) SONA Experiment Management System and were compensated 
with one research credit. After examination of the data inclusion criteria, specified in the 
following section, data from 10 participants were omitted resulting in a final sample of 103 
participants (females = 73, males = 30). Ages ranged from 18 to 50 years (M = 21.50, SD = 
6.10). Reported daily computer use ranged from 2 to 23 hours (M = 8.35, SD = 3.99). The 
number of 2FA devices participants registered to any given account enrolled in 2FA ranged from 
1 to 5 (M = 1.58, SD = 0.92). All participants reported corrected to normal vision. See Table 1 
and 2 for additional demographic information. 
 
Table 1 
Frequency Table for Declared Major 
Declared Major n % 
Sciences 44 40.7 
Education 21 19.4 
Arts and Letters 18 16.7 
Health Science 15 13.9 
Engineering and Technology 5 4.5 
Business 3 2.8 
No Major Declared 2 1.9 
Note. N = 103. 
 




Frequency Table for Type of Electronics Commonly Used 
Electronic Type n % 
Desktop Computer 41 39.8 
Laptop Computer 100 97.1 
Smartphone 101 98.1 
Smartwatch 39 37.9 
Tablet 23 22.3 
Other – Gaming System 4 3.9 
Note. Participants were given the option to select more than one electronic type, which resulted 
in the collection of 308 responses. The percentage represents the proportion of participants that 
reported typically using a given technology (N = 103). 
 
2.2 Materials and Procedure 
This research used a 42-question survey that took participants approximately 35 minutes to 
complete. Previous research has noted that self-report is a valid measure for the topics that are 
covered by the survey of the current study (Cain et al., 2018; Russell, Weems, Ahmed, & 
Richard III, 2017). According to Russell et al. (2017), when users do not behave securely, the 
reports of their non-secure behaviors still result in honest reporting.  
Participants viewed an informed consent document and were asked to accept the terms of 
the study before participating (see Appendix B). Participants were instructed to read the 
questions and statements thoroughly and to provide an honest and accurate answer. Participants 
were encouraged to select an answer for all questions. For instance, if an item went unanswered, 
the system alerted and prompted them to choose an answer before proceeding. However, it was 
not mandatory for the participants to select an answer on any survey question.  
   
 
28 
The survey itself consisted of five sections of questions: demographics, general 
knowledge of authentication concepts, knowledge of authentication threats, the Berlin Numeracy 
Test, and perception of different account recovery methods (see Appendix A).  
 
2.2.1 Demographics Section 1 
The survey asked participants 18 demographic questions to get a better description of the sample. 
The demographic questions consisted of Yes/No, fill-in-the-blank, check all that apply, and 
multiple-choice questions. Questions one, two, four, and six through 12 were directly from the 
cyber hygiene article produced by Cain et al. (2018). Question three was a self-report item 
regarding a participant’s eyesight. Item five addressed participants’ declared college major. 
Question 13 was the attention check question, “Is your heart beating?”. The last five questions 
were created to reflect participants’ experience with 2FA and account recovery.  
 
2.2.2 Knowledge of Authentication: General Concepts Section 2 and Threats Section 3  
To develop the content for the general concepts- and threats- authentication knowledge sections 
2 and 3, we chose seven questions (two general and five threats) from the Cain et al. (2018) 
article that related to authentication practices. Cain et al. (2018) noted that their survey was 
developed based on government website topics that highlight the best cybersecurity practices and 
referred to previous literature that also evaluated these topics. The knowledge of general 
authentication concepts, section 2, consisted of three questions about authentication security 
concepts and one attention check question. The first two questions were from the cyber hygiene 
survey (Cain et al., 2018); these questions focused on capturing the participants' knowledge of 
common authentication terminology. The new third question was created to assess whether users 
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understand the operational definition of authentication (e.g., the process of verifying the identity 
of the user). The fourth inquiry was an instructed attention check, “We care about data quality, to 
ensure you are currently paying attention can you please select the color option “Yellow”?”. All 
four questions in the authentication concepts section were multiple-choice and had four possible 
answer choices, with only one answer being correct. 
The knowledge of authentication threats, section 3, provided seven statements, which 
included one attention-check prompt. The first five knowledge of threats statements were from 
the cyber hygiene article (Cain et al., 2018); these statements focused on capturing the 
participants' knowledge regarding common threats, behaviors, or outcomes associated with 
secure authentication practices. An example of a threats statement is, “It is safe to share a 
password with others”. Participants were asked to choose from the choices Strongly Agree, 
Agree, Neither Agree nor Disagree, Disagree, and Strongly Disagree. The sixth statement was 
the attention check statement, “Please respond with Strongly Agree to this question.” Renaud’s 
(2007) opportunistic score prompts inspired the last statement. Specifically, the statement 
focused on addressing participants' knowledge about the threat associated with authentication 
error messages.  
 
2.2.3 Berlin Numeracy Test Section 4 
The numeracy test, section 4, consists of the full seven question Berlin Numeracy Test (BNT; 
Cokely et al., 2012; Schwartz et al., 1997). The traditional BNT consists of four relatively 
difficult items suited for moderate-to-highly numerate individuals (Cokely et al., 2012). 
However, to provide additional discriminability for low-to-moderate numerate individuals, it is 
suggested that the 3 relatively easy Schwartz et al. (1997) items be added to the 4-item BNT 
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(Cokely, Ghazal, & Garcia-Retamero, 2014; Petrova et al., 2019). Previous research has shown 
that using the combination of both easy and challenging items shows better discriminability than 
using the tests alone (Petrova et al., 2019). The numeracy test was used as a predictor of the 
participant’s comprehension of everyday risk. Previous research indicates that the numeracy test 
has adequate internal consistency with Cronbach a scores ranging from .70 to .75 (Cokely et al., 
2012).  
For this section of the survey, participants are asked to fill-in-the-blank with the correct 
answer with only one answer being correct. A participant’s risk literacy score was calculated by 
counting the number of correct answers given and summing of all the participant’s correct 
answers (possible range of 0 – 7).  
 
2.2.4 Perception Section 5 
Before inquiring about account recovery method perceptions, the participants were given images 
and a short description for each of the four different account recovery methods (e.g., fallback 
phone numbers, generated account recovery codes, graphical passcodes, and color grid pattern; 
see Appendix A – section 5). When account recovery methods are applied in real situations, 
typically, there is not any information provided about the different methods. However, some 
methods may have been unfamiliar to participants, so a brief description of each method was 
provided. Also, the short descriptions provided participants with information hinting at the 
security of the given method.  
To establish whether or not participants attended to the account recovery descriptions, the 
following Yes/No question was added: 
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It is vital to our research that we only include responses from people that devoted their 
attention to this study. In your honest opinion, should we use your data for this section in 
our analyses? (You will receive credit for this study even if you provide a negative 
response)  
Several studies have noted that participants will honestly report whether or not they think their 
data should be included (Brühlmann & Mekler, 2018; Cunningham, Godinho, Kushnir, & 
Bertholet, 2017; Curran, 2016; Meade & Craig, 2012). The results of Meade and Craig's (2017) 
study indicated that this question, in combination with the other attention check questions, is a 
good strategy for weeding out careless responders. We found a moderate rate of participants that 
responded with “No” do not include their data (N = 25). We used this question as a quasi-
experimental variable to evaluate the raw data for each survey question to compare participants 
that indicated “Yes” to those who selected “No”. Significant differences between the “Yes” and 
“No” groups were found for the BNT score variable. This group difference is examined more 
closely in the statistical analyses results section that included the BNT score as a variable. The 
raw data for the groups did not significantly differ for any other variable evaluated in the results 
section.  
In the perception section 5, participants were asked to rank order the recovery methods 
for three different perceived qualities: security, memorability, and ease of use. The last two 
survey questions regarded account recovery method preferences. First, participants were asked to 
choose their preferred account recovery method. The last question was open-ended and asked 
participants, “Why would you prefer to use this recovery method?” Upon completing the survey, 
participants were thanked and provided with a debriefing statement (see Appendix A).  
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2.2.5 Participant Exclusion Criteria 
Each survey section had a different level of importance to the study. Therefore, missing data 
cases were handled uniquely for each section to help with data preservation. To further secure 
the integrity of our data, the survey included three instructional attention check prompts. If a 
participant responded incorrectly to two or more of the attention checks, their data were omitted 
from the data analysis (N = 1). 
The BNT, section 4, was a critical study variable. If a participant failed to answer all 
seven numeracy questions, their data were omitted for the data analysis (N = 1). Additionally, it 
is possible that participants might have been inclined to cheat and use the internet as a source for 
answers because this study was conducted online. If this occurred, the validity of the BNT scores 
would be threatened. To account for this threat, the average amount of time spent on the BNT 
and the standard deviation were evaluated (M = 389.49s, SD = 351.59s). Data from 5 participants 
suggested a response time that was more or less than two standard deviations from the mean, 
which resulted in omitting their data from all analyses. 
Participants’ perceived security of the recovery methods, in section 5, was also a critical 
study component. If a participant failed to answer the security ranking question, their data were 
omitted from all data analyses (N = 3). These data cleaning criteria resulted in the exclusion of 
10 participants from all data analyses. 
There were two additionally cases of missing data for the two nonessential study 
variables of ranking recovery methods by ease of use (N = 1) and memorability (N = 1); 
however, these two participants were not excluded from any data analyses.  




DATA CODING STRATEGIES 
The following sections detail the processes used to code the data in preparation for statistical 
analysis. We highlight the process used to calculate a participant’s overall authentication 
knowledge score. We establish the coding strategies used to determine the objective security 
ranking of the recovery methods by detailing opportunistic score calculations. Additionally, we 
walk through the process used to assess participants' ability to correctly rank order the recovery 
methods in terms of their security. The last section consists of the strategies used to categorize 
and code the participant’s account recovery method preference reasoning. 
 
3.1 Overall Authentication Knowledge Score  
The scores for the concept- and threat- authentication knowledge sections were combined to 
create an overall knowledge score. The three concept authentication knowledge questions only 
had one correct answer, and they were scored dichotomously. In order to combine the concept- 
with the threat- authentication knowledge scores, the 5-point Likert scale score used for the six 
questions in the threat section was changed to a binary score. Depending on the question, due to 
the reverse coding of some of items, participant answers that were marked Strongly Disagree or 
Disagree were scored as incorrect or correct responses and the answers of Strongly Agree or 
Agree were scored as incorrect or correct responses (see Appendix A – section 4). The response 
Neither Agree nor Disagree was scored as incorrect for all questions. The number of correct 
concept- and threat- authentication knowledge responses were summed to determine a 
participant’s overall authentication knowledge score (possible range of 0 – 9).  
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Cain et al. (2018) performed a similar type of data coding strategy wherein they 
combined their concepts and threat knowledge sections. Cain et al. (2018) reported a Cronbach a 
of .50 for the concept knowledge questions section and Cronbach a of .78 when the concept and 
threat knowledge questions sections were combined. The current study found a Cronbach a of 
.60 after combining the concept and threat authentication knowledge items in order to obtain 
participants’ overall authentication knowledge scores. Notably, Cain et al. (2018) survey covered 
a wider range of cybersecurity topics and deployed a total of 34 threat and concept knowledge 
questions. The current study only employed a subset of their questions that pertained to the topic 
of authentication security (e.g., two concept and five threat questions). This study’s low number 
of concept and threat knowledge questions (e.g., nine total) might have impacted the Cronbach a 
we found.  
 
3.2 Opportunistic Score Calculations 
Renaud (2007) provides a detailed criterion for calculating the opportunistic score for a given 
authentication scheme. Following the prompts and scoring guide for each opportunistic category, 
a score for each recovery method was determined (Renaud, 2007). The number of prompts for 
each category is as follows: one guessability, one recordability, two observability, eight 
analyzability, and six resistibility prompts. It is important to note that only seven out of the 18 
opportunistic prompts regard the security protocols of the authentication or recovery scheme. 
The other 11 prompts regard the authentication security protocol of the system itself. 
Specifically, this was the case for six analyzability prompts (e.g., a – f) and five resistibility 
prompts (e.g., a & c – f; see Appendix C). For the 11 prompts that inquired about the 
authentication security of the system, the same security score was consistently assigned for all 
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the recovery methods. The score for each of the 11 system prompts was assigned according to 
the prompt score that suggested the system was implementing the best attack resistant strategy. 
For example, the “(a) Usernames” prompt for analyzability states:  
“Users should be assigned usernames rather than email addresses because email 
addresses are too easily obtainable and make it easier for hackers to gain access to the 
system. A 1 is assigned if the system uses email addresses as usernames and a 0 if unique 
usernames are used and not visible to other users” (Renaud, 2007, p. 18). 
This prompt suggests that systems that assign usernames are more resistant to attacks, thus 
indicating that each recovery method should receive a score of 0 for this prompt.  
The other seven opportunistic prompts that considered the security of the given method 
rely on the designer’s interpretation. Specifically, this was the case for the: guessability prompt, 
recordability prompt, observability prompts, two analyzability prompts (e.g., g & h), and one 
resistibility prompt (e.g., b; see Appendix C). For example, the recordability prompt states:  
“As regards recordability, the systems can be assigned values as follows: 1 if the code is 
easily recorded; 0.5 if it was harder to record or describe, or if recording of the key does 
not provide an observer with the full key; 0 if it is difficult or impossible to record or 
describe, such as, for example, a biometric” (Renaud, 2007, p. 17). 
The term “easily recorded” is not operationally defined, suggesting that designers are to 
determine for themselves what they consider to be an easily recordable interaction. 
In general, to calculate an overall opportunistic score for each account recovery method, 
the score for each prompt in the guessability, recordability, observability, and analyzability 
categories are added together and divided by the sum of the prompts for the recordability 
category. Lower opportunistic scores indicate higher authentication attack resistance.  
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For the current study, the principal investigator and four other research assistants rated 
each recovery method on the seven subjective prompts to avoid bias in the interpretation of the 
Renaud’s (2007) opportunistic score instructions. The research assistants were given task 
instructions, the Renaud (2007) article to read, and the same account recovery descriptions that 
were provided in this study’s survey (see Appendix A – section 5). The researchers received an 
excel sheet with all 18 opportunistic prompts with score guides (see Appendix C). The 11 system 
prompts were pre-scored, and the seven remaining prompts had empty cells for scoring each 
recovery method. To allow for a more detailed discussion about rating discrepancies, research 
assistants were asked to explain why they assigned values to the given opportunist category 
prompts. The researcher’s ratings were assessed on a descriptive level to evaluate the recovery 
method ranking orders. The researchers discussed and attempted to resolve any coding 
discrepancies, but consistent ratings could not be achieved. However, four out of the five 
researchers found that the total opportunistic scores for the fallback phone number and account 
recovery codes suggested they were ranked either 1st or 2nd most secure. Whereas the color grid 
pattern and graphical passcode scores suggested they ranked as less secure in either the 3rd or 4th 
position. In lieu of this, the total opportunistic score for each recovery method was averaged 
across raters to find the final objective recovery method rank order.  
The averaged opportunistic score calculations resulted in the account recovery methods 
ranked by most attack resistance as follows: 1st fallback phone number, 2nd generated account 
recovery codes, 3rd color grid pattern, and 4th graphical passcode (see Table 3). 
 




Total Opportunistic Score for Each Account Recovery Method by Researcher Assistants  
Researcher 









Principal Investigator  0.125 0.214 0.286 0.25 
Research Assistant 1 0.139 0.219 0.219 0.563 
Research Assistant 2 0.071 0.214 0.357 0.149 
Research Assistant 3 0.214 0.179 0.429 0.464 
Research Assistant 4 0.214 0.286 0.179 0.179 
Average Score  0.153 0.222 0.294 0.320 
Note. The average score row reflects the average opportunistic score for a given recovery method 
when total scores were averaged across raters.  
 
3.3 Coding Strategy for User’s Subjective Security Ranking of Account Recovery Methods  
The survey question that instructed participants to, “rank order the account recovery methods 
from safest (1) to least safe (4)”, was coded using Kendall’s tau rank method to derive a ranking 
distance score and tau correlation coefficient (Kendall, 1938). The tau rank correlation is a non-
parametric statistical test that was used to establish the degree of agreement between the 
objective opportunistic score ranking and the participant’s subjective security ranking of the 
account recovery methods (Kendall, 1938). As a comparison, Spearman’s rho (ρ; 1904) rank 
correlation focuses on rank distances, Kendall’s tau correlation (τ; 1938) is used for evaluating 
rank differences. The opportunistic score results suggested that the target rank order is: (1) 
fallback phone number, (2) account recovery codes, (3) color grid pattern, and (4) graphical 
passcode. We used Kendall’s tau distance measure to find the relative order difference between 
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the two rank orders (e.g., objective opportunistic ranks and participant’s subjective ranking). To 
calculate the distance, we compared each given positional rank to the ranks that proceed it. A 
score of +1 was assigned when the relative order of the pair was correct (e.g., concordant pair), 
and a score of -1 was assigned if the relative order was incorrect (e.g., discordant pair). Table 4 
provides an example for a participant that ranked the account recovery methods as 2314.  
 
Table 4 
Kendall’s (1938) Tau Distance Score for a Participant that Ranked the Methods as 2314 
Rank 
Position  






2 3 = +1 1 = -1 4 = +1 +1 2 rτ = .33 
3 1 = -1 4 = +1 -  0 
1 4 = +1 -  -  +1 
Note. N = 89. 
 
The tau rank correlation uses Kendall’s tau distance score divided by the number that 
represents a “perfect” score (see Figure 3). The n in the equation represents the number of 
forced-rank positions (e.g., n = 4). For the current research, we found that 6 represents a 
“perfect” score for the formula denominator. A tau correlation coefficient will be calculated for 
each participant and will result in a coefficient between 1 to -1. A correlation coefficient of 1 
would result from a perfect match between a participant’s ranking and the objective 
opportunistic ranking. A completely independent relationship between the ranks would yield a 0, 
and the worst possible relation between the ranks would yield a -1. For the example of the 
participant that ranked the account recovery methods as 2314, we would find the number of 
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concordant pairs (4) minus the number of discordant (2) pairs equals 2. The tau correlation of 
this example would yield a coefficient of rτ = (2/6) = .33.  
 
Figure 3 
Kendall’s (1938) Tau Correlation Coefficient Formula 
 
 
It is important to note that the interpretation of the strength of Kendall’s tau rank 
correlation coefficient values is not standardized (Bachmann & Bernstein, 2010). Bachmann and 
Bernstein (2010) specified that Kendall’s tau typically generates lower correlation values and 
cannot be meaningfully compared to other rank correlation values. When Kendall’s tau rank 
correlation (1938) is used in circumstances where there are only four ranking positions, there are 
only 7 possible tau correlation coefficient values that can result (e.g., 1, 0.66, 0.33, 0, -0.33, -
0.66, -1). For this research, we rationalize for the strength of the tau correlation coefficient 
values to be interpreted as follows: 0 to +/- .33 as a weak correlation; -0.33 to -0.66 as a 
moderate negative correlation; 0.33 to 0.66 as a moderate positive correlation; -0.66 to -1 as a 
strong negative correlation; and 0.66 to 1 as a strong positive correlation. Interpreting the 
strength of the correlations in this way allowed us to determine the threshold that indicates users 
are comprehending the security provided by the recovery methods. The correlation strength 
parameters are used for hypothesis one, which predicts that the correlation between the objective 
security ranking and participants' perceived security will be less than .33 on average. This 
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suggests the objective versus subjective rankings have less than a moderate positive correlation 
on average.  
 
3.4 Categorization and Coding Strategy for User’s Account Recovery Method Preference 
Reasoning 
The last two survey items regard participant’s account recovery method preference. First, 
participants were asked which recovery method they would choose to use. Then they were asked 
to explain why. Participant’s preference reasoning data were used to explore what type of 
account recovery method attributes lead to method choice. The author and a research assistant 
used Glaser and Strauss’s (1967) Grounded Theory strategies to code participant’s account 
recovery method preference reasoning into nominal scale categories. Grounded Theory is a 
systematic approach for conducting qualitative data research wherein research questions are 
established a posteriori based on the specific research data that is collected (Glaser & Strauss, 
1967).  
The researchers conducted a thematic research analysis by independently reading each 
participant’s annotative reasoning and creating a list of category themes based on the observed 
responses. The researchers discussed the themes and merged the findings to create a consolidated 
category coding list. The final coding list resulted in 11 categories, wherein 4 categories were 
assigned subcategories. In sum, there were 29 possible categories and subcategories used to code 
responses for each recovery method. Notably, participant’s answers were fairly straight forward; 
thus, the majority of the 29 subcategories represent the explicit words that participants used to 
describe a given method. The 11 main categories were created to umbrella the subcategory 
descriptors using human factors terminology. For example, the term “High Usability” is often 
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used to indicate that an interaction or product possess qualities such as being, “easy to use”, 
“efficient”, “effective”, “reliable”, “convenient”, etc. (Hornbaek, 2006; Mator et al., 2020). For a 
more detailed report on the operational definitions of the categories and subcategories, see Table 
5. The researchers noticed that in addition to describing a preferred method, participants often 
addressed aspects of other recovery methods. To maximize the breadth of findings, each 
narrative was coded to capture the details of all recovery methods referenced during the second 
round of coding.  
Both researchers analyzed the participant’s responses independently a second time 
(Egelman et al., 2014; Kraus, Schmidt, Walch, Schaub, & Möller, 2017). The researchers used 
the established category and subcategory list to code the participant’s preference responses. 
Specifically, to code a narrative, the researchers would mark which recovery method was being 
described and assign the detail to a given category and, when applicable, subcategory. The same 
two researchers were employed for both rounds of coding to allow for the raters to be well-
calibrated on what to look for. This trained rater approach is similar to previous research 
methods that have been used when evaluating qualitative data in phases (Angeli, 2013; 
Greenhow, Li, & Mai, 2019). 
To compare the coded results, a fully crossed design was employed, and we defined 
interrater reliability as the propensity for any two human factors researchers to assign an account 
recovery method annotation to the same category and subcategory (Hallgren, 2012). To 
determine a beyond chance interrater agreement coefficient, we used Cohen’s (1960) version of 
Kappa (κ). The Landis and Koch (1977) benchmark scale was used to establish the level of 
agreement between raters (Alonso, 2013; Hallgren, 2017). Specifically, the scale characterizes 
the raters beyond chance agreement level according to different range values of κ (Hallgren, 
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2017; Landis & Koch, 1977). Generally, κ values of .81 or more reflect almost prefect to perfect 
agreement, values between .60 and .80 typically reflect good agreement, values .41 and .59 
typically reflect moderate agreement, and values between .21 and .40 reflect fair agreement and 
κ values below .20 are interpreted as poor agreement (Fleiss, Levin, & Paik, 2003; Hallgren, 
2017; Hornbaek, 2006; Landis & Koch, 1977). The results of our interrater analysis suggested 
good agreement between raters, κ = .728, p < .001. Before statistically analyzing the data, all 
coding discrepancies between raters were resolved by discussing until a unanimous agreement 
was reached (N = 217). 
 
Table 5 
Categories and Subcategories for Coding Recovery Method Preference Reasoning 
Categories Definition  Subcategories 
High Usability  • If the participant referenced a recovery method as 
having any quality that is expressed in the 
subcategory list. 
• Easy to Use 
• Simple 
• Effective 
• Efficient  
• Reliable 
• Requires Less 
Effort 
• Convenient 
• Sufficient  
• Versatile 
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Categories Definition  Subcategories 
Low Usability - If the participant referenced a recovery method as 




- Less Effective 
- Less Efficient  




• If the participant indicated that they are a visual 
learner or they expressed the method aesthetically 
pleasing by using descriptions such as, “I like the 
visual aspect”, “it's pretty”, or “I like colors”. 








- If the participant indicated that they would use 
their phone number or they always have their 
phone on them, they were classified in the likely 
misunderstood method description.  
- If the participant displayed knowledge of the 
recovery methods and noted that the method's 
weakness consists of people disregarding the 2FA 
setup instructions by using their phone number, 






Familiar • The participant referred to a method as being 
familiar, common, conventional, traditional, or 
worked in the past. 
 
Unfamiliar - Participants referred to a method as being 
unfamiliar or uncommon. 
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Categories Definition  Subcategories 
Easy to 
Remember 
• Participants implied that the method enhances their 
ability to more easily recall or remember the 
associated password or passcode. The participant 
indicated that they could recall/reference the 
location of pertinent information. Participants 
specified they don't have to remember anything. 
The participant’s description suggested a methods 




- The participant implied they would not be able to 
remember a method’s associated password or 
passcode. 
 
Secure  • The participant indicated that a given method is 
safer to use than the others, the safest or most 
secure, provides good account protection, hard to 
hack, or the password or passcode cannot be 
guessed easily. 
 
Unsecure - The participant indicated that a given method is not 
the most secure, is not the safest, it can be easily 





• The participant indicated that the method elicits an 
inconvenience, burden, or it can be intrusive to an 
emergency contact.  
 
 





This study asked participants to answer survey questions regarding their general authentication 
knowledge, knowledge of threats, risk literacy abilities, and perception of different account 
recovery methods. In the following result sections, we report the descriptive data and statistical 
findings. All statistical tests used an a level of .05 to indicate the probability of rejecting the null 
hypothesis. 
 
4.1 Descriptive Data Analyses  
4.1.1 Demographics 
First, we present the descriptive findings, in text and figures, related to participants’ 
cybersecurity familiarity and experience with -2FA and -2FA account recovery. Twenty percent 
of participants indicated they had previous exposure to some type of educational cybersecurity 
material (see Table 6). When the survey data were collected, it was mandatory for all ODU 
students to have their accounts enrolled in 2FA. However, only 89% of participants indicated 
that they used 2FA to protect any personal accounts. This may suggest that the conceptual 
meaning of 2FA might not be apparent to some users. Eighty-one percent of participants 
indicated they use a smartphone or tablet app as their second factor, and 60% of participants only 
have one 2FA device enrolled per account (M = 1.58, SD = 0.92). For more reports on 2FA 
familiarity, see Table 7 and Figures 4 and 5. Forty-three percent of participants indicated they 
had previously set up a 2FA account recovery option for cases such as a lost or stolen second 
factor wherein 56% indicated they set up a secondary email as an account recovery option. For a 
complete report on 2FA account recovery familiarity, see Table 8 and Figure 6. 





Frequency Table for Cybersecurity Familiarity 
Variable n % 
Received Cybersecurity Training   
 Yes 11 10.7 
 No 92 89.3 
Training Location   
 Work 8 7.5 
 School 5 4.7 
 Online 2 1.9 
 Other – Military 2 1.9 
 N/A 89 84.0 
Taken a Class with Cybersecurity Topics   
 Yes 16 15.5 
 No 87 84.5 
Cybersecurity Expert   
 Yes 1 1.0 
 No 102 99.0 
Target of a Cybersecurity Attack   
 Yes 17 16.5 
 No 86 83.5 
Note. N = 103. 
 




Frequency Table for 2FA Familiarity 
Variable n % 
Use 2FA to Protect Personal Accounts    
 Yes 89 86.4 
 No 14 13.6 
Note. N = 103. 
 




Frequency of 2FA Devices Used by Type 
 
Note. The 89 participants who reported Yes to using 2FA were asked to indicate the type of 2FA 
devices they had used. Participants had the option to select more than one kind of 2FA device, 
which resulted in N = 144 responses. The percentage represents the proportion of participants out 
of the 89 participants who reported they use 2FA.  




Frequency of the Number of 2FA Devices Enrolled per Account 
 
Note. The percentage represents the proportion of participants out of the 89 participants who 
reported they use 2FA. 
 




Frequency Table for 2FA Account Recovery Familiarity 
Variable  n % 
Setup 2FA Account Recovery Option    
 Yes 39 43.8 
 No 50 56.2 
Note. N = 89. 
 




Frequency of 2FA Account Recovery Methods Used by Type 
 
Note. The 39 participants that reported they had set up 2FA account recovery were asked to 
indicate the type of option they had setup. Participants had the opportunity to select more than 
one type of recovery option, which resulted in 48 responses. The percentage represents the 
proportion of participants out of the 39 participants that reported using 2FA account recovery.  
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4.1.2 Perception and Preference Qualities Associated with Account Recovery Methods 
This section presents the percentage of participants that perceived each account recovery method 
as being most -secure, -memorable, and -easiest to use. We highlight the recovery methods that 
would be preferred and why. These findings help accentuate characteristics that may aid in 
determining viable 2FA account recovery solutions.  
Thirty-five percent of participants indicated that the generated recovery codes method 
was the safest. Thirty-eight percent of participants indicated that the fallback phone number 
method would presumably be the easiest to use and 46% of participants indicated that it would 
be the most memorable. For a more detailed report on recovery method perception qualities, see 
Figure 7.  
Of the given recovery method options, 45% of participants indicated that they would 
choose the fallback phone number as their account recovery method. For a more detailed report 
on recovery method preference, see Figure 8.  
 




Frequency of Perceived Qualities Related to Account Recovery Methods 
 





























Frequency of Recovery Method Preferred Choice  
 
Note. N = 103. 
 
The last question of the survey invited participants to explain why they preferred a given 
recovery method. The 103 participants provided a total of 217 open-ended descriptions 
expressing account recovery method preferences and opinions. Specifically, 95 responses 
mentioned the fallback phone number, 53 the generated recovery codes, 36 the color grid pattern, 
and 33 the graphical passcode.  
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We further evaluated the frequency of category mentions by collapsing across the 
recovery methods. We found that a majority of the 217 responses, 34%, regarded the high 
usability aspects. The second most referenced category was easy to remember, captured by 13% 
of the responses. For a more detailed report on the frequency of category descriptions, see Table 
9. Figure 9 depicts the relative mentions of a category concerning the account recovery method 
being described. As previously noted, 4 categories consisted of subcategories. See Figures 10 




Frequency of Categories Mentioned  
Category n % 
High Usability  74 34.1 
Low Usability  20 9.2 
Easy to Remember 28 12.9 
Difficult to Remember 15 6.9 
Secure 27 12.4 
Unsecure  11 5.1 
Familiar 4 1.8 
Unfamiliar 5 2.3 
Visual Processing Preference 10 4.6 
Setup Instructions Might be Disregarded 22 10.1 
Intrusive to Emergency Contact  1 0.5 
Note. N = 217. 
 




Frequency of Open-ended Response Categories Describing Account Recovery Methods 
 
Note. N = 217.  




Frequency of High Usability Subcategories by Account Recovery Method  
 
Note. The percentage represents the proportion of subcategory responses out of the 74 total High 
Usability responses for all recovery methods.  
 




Frequency of Low Usability Subcategories by Account Recovery Method  
 
Note. The percentage represents the proportion of subcategory responses out of the 20 total Low 
Usability responses for all recovery methods.  
 




Frequency of Visual Processing Preference Subcategories by Account Recovery Method  
 
Note. The percentage represents the proportion of subcategory responses out of the 10 total 
Visual Processing Preference responses for all recovery methods.  
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4.2 Statistical Data Analyses  
In this statistical analysis section, we tested our four critical survey hypotheses and two general 
research questions. The critical hypothesis evaluations consist of (1) the similarity between 
account recovery methods ranked safest to least safe according to the opportunistic score 
objective ranking and participant’s subjective ranking. (2) An analysis of the relations between 
BNT scores and account recovery security ranking abilities. This research will also present the 
findings of participants’ overall authentication knowledge as it relates to (3) cybersecurity 
training and (4) gender. The statistical analysis for general research inquiries consist of exploring 
the relationship between the participant’s ability to rank account recovery methods in terms of 
security to participant’s overall authentication knowledge score and to their cybersecurity 
training experience. Additionally, we explore characteristics that may or may not predict secure 
account recovery method selection, including experience with 2FA and experience with account 
recovery. These findings highlight characteristics that may predict participants’ ability to 
determine the security associated with a 2FA account recovery solutions. 
 
4.2.1 Kendall Tau Correlation Significance 
Our first hypothesis proposed that the tau correlations coefficients (rτ) that results from 
comparing participant’s subjective security rank order of the account the recovery methods and 
the objective recovery method rank order that was determined using Renaud’s (2007) 
opportunistic score will be less than moderate rτ = .33 on average. A one-sample t-test was 
conducted to explore the tau correlation coefficients. Results indicated participant’s average tau 
correlation coefficient (M = 0.11, SD = 0.56) was significantly less than the moderate positive 
correlation lower-end cutoff of rτ = .33, t(102) = -4.08, p < .001, d = -0.402. The Shapiro-Wilk 
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assumption check of normality was violated; we plotted the distribution of the values which 
revealed that the tau coefficients were very scattered and slightly bimodal.  
 
4.2.2 Risk Numeracy and Kendall Tau Correlations for the Subjective Security Ranking of 
Account Recovery Methods  
The second hypothesis proposed that there would be a positive relationship between user’s BNT 
scores and account recovery security ranking abilities. We expected that participants who have a 
higher risk perception BNT score would reflect fewer ranking discrepancies when they are asked 
to order the account recovery methods by their security. To test this hypothesis, a linear 
regression was conducted to determine how well the risk numeracy scores predict the tau 
correlation coefficients. A linear regression model revealed that the BNT score (M = 2.51, SD = 
1.57) did not statistically significantly predict a tau correlation coefficient, F(1, 101) = 0.153, p = 
.696, R2 = 0.002. For every 1 BNT score increase, the tau correlation coefficient is expected to 
increase by 0.014. This suggests a person’s numeracy ability cannot predict their ability to 
correctly rank order the account recovery methods according to the security they provide. The 
assumption of linearity was violated, which may indicate an inefficient model; however, all other 
assumptions were met. A violation of linearity may have occurred due to both variables having 
different distribution patterns; specifically, BNT scores were positively skewed, and the Tau 
coefficients were scattered.  
As previously noted, we evaluated the raw data for each variable to compare the 
responses of participants that indicated “Yes”, use their data, to those who selected “No”, do not 
use their data. The results of an independent samples t-test suggested BNT scores for participants 
who selected “No” (M = 1.80, SD = 0.91, N = 25) were significantly lower than those who 
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selected “Yes” (M = 2.73, SD = 1.67, N = 78), t(101) = -2.66, p = .009, d = -0.612. However, the 
linear regression results did not change when the participants who selected “No” were included 
in the analysis. As a result, the analysis for this hypothesis included the data of both the 
participants who indicated “Yes” and those who indicated “No”. 
 
4.2.3 Overall Authentication Knowledge and Cybersecurity Training 
The third hypothesis proposed that prior cybersecurity training would not significantly impact 
the participant’s authentication knowledge. The results revealed that out of the nine concept- and 
threat- authentication knowledge questions, participants answered more than half correctly on 
average (M = 6.91, SD = 1.70). However, a low number of participants indicated that they had, 
“… received training in cybersecurity…” (N = 11). To make group sizes more equal, the “yes” 
cybersecurity training group was expanded to include participants that indicated they are a 
cybersecurity expert, or they have taken classes that covered cybersecurity topics. Specifically, 
we added the participants that selected “yes” to the questions, “Have you taken classes covering 
the topic of cybersecurity in the past?” or “Do you consider yourself an expert in cybersecurity?” 
(N = 21; see Appendix A – section 1).  
To test our third hypothesis, an independent samples t-test (Cybersecurity training: yes 
and no) was used to explore the relationship between overall authentication knowledge and 
training in cybersecurity. Overall authentication knowledge scores for participants who had not 
received any form of cybersecurity training (M = 6.83, SD = 1.71, N = 82) were not significantly 
different from the scores of participants who had received cybersecurity training (M = 7.24, SD = 
1.67, N = 21), t(101) = -0.98, p = 0.165, d = -0.240. Levene’s test suggested equal variances (F = 
.48, p = 0.492). The Shapiro-Wilk assumption check of normality was violated. The researchers 
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plotted the data and observed that participants without cybersecurity training reflected a 
positively skewed distribution, and participants with cybersecurity training had a negatively 
skewed distribution, which likely caused the normality violation. 
 
4.2.4 Overall Authentication Knowledge and Gender  
The fourth hypothesis proposed that concept- and threat- authentication knowledge scores would 
be higher for males. To test this hypothesis, an independent samples t-test (Gender: male and 
female) was conducted to explore the relations between overall authentication knowledge and 
gender. Results suggested the opposite of the proposed hypothesis. Females (M = 7.22, SD = 
1.32, N = 73) had significantly higher overall authentication knowledge scores than males (M = 
6.17, SD = 2.26, N = 30), t(37) = 2.39, p = .002, d = 0.616. Levene’s test suggested unequal 
variances (F = 9.26, p = 0.003), degrees of freedom were adjusted from 101 to 37. The Shapiro-
Wilk assumption check of normality was also violated. It is likely that these violations occurred 
because four male participants reflected near floor performance, which was different from the 
distribution of performance values for females and the other males. However, the data revealed 
that the performance of the four males on other measures (e.g., BNT, Tau Ranking) was near 
average, which implies that removing their data from all analyses would not be justified.  
 
4.2.5 Account Recovery Methods Perceived as Safest and Experience with 2FA 
A 2 (2FA experience: yes and no) x 4 (Account method that was selected as the safest: fallback 
phone numbers, generated account recovery codes, color grid, and graphical passcode) chi-
square test was conducted to explore the relations between past experience with 2FA and the 
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frequency participants selected a given account recovery method as the safest. The relationship 
was not significant, X2 (3, N = 103) = 4.01, p = .260. 
 
4.2.6 Account Recovery Methods Perceived as Safest and Experience with 2FA Account 
Recovery 
A 2 (2FA account recovery experience: yes and no) x 4 (recovery method that was selected as 
the safest: fallback phone numbers, generated account recovery codes, color grid, and graphical 
passcode) chi-square test was conducted to explore the relations between past experience with 
2FA account recovery and account recovery method selection. The relationship was not 
significant, X2 (3, N = 89) = 1.56, p = .668. 
 
4.2.7 Kendall Tau Ranking Coefficients and Cybersecurity Training   
An independent samples t-test (Cybersecurity training: yes and no) was used to explore the 
relations between the tau correlations coefficients that resulted from ranking the account 
recovery methods by security strength and cybersecurity training experience. The tau correlation 
coefficients for participants who had not received any form of cybersecurity training (M = 0.11, 
SD = 0.57, N = 82) were not significantly different from the tau coefficients of participants who 
had received cybersecurity training (M = 0.10, SD = 0.49, N = 21), t(101) = 0.11, p = 0.915, d = 
0.026. Levene’s test suggested equal variances (F = 1.49, p = 0.225). The Shapiro-Wilk 
assumption check of normality was violated; upon reviewing the distribution of the data the 
normality violation likely occurred because cybersecurity training groups reflected oppositely 
skewed distributions. 
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4.2.7 Kendall Tau Ranking Coefficients and Overall Authentication Knowledge Scores  
A Pearson correlation test was used to establish the relations between overall authentication 
knowledge scores and the tau correlation coefficients. The results suggested there is not a 
significant relationship between the two variables, r(101) = -.09, p = .346. 





5.1 Hypotheses and Research Questions  
This research presented the descriptive findings of what users know, perceive, and prefer with 
respect to 2FA and account recovery. Also, the impact of risk numeracy aptitude, authentication 
knowledge, and cybersecurity familiarity on the ability to rank order account security strength of 
recovery methods correctly were explored.  
We examined participants' understanding of the security strength of popular account 
recovery methods. Further, individual differences characteristics that might impact their 
understanding were examined. For instance, our findings regarding the impact of an individual’s 
overall authentication knowledge and risk numeracy on ranking abilities are insightful. We 
compared participant’s subjective ranking of the recovery methods by security strength to the 
objective security ranking. We found evidence to support our first hypothesis, which proposed 
that on average tau correlation coefficients would reflect a less than moderately positive 
performance. This suggests that users cannot accurately gauge the amount of security that a 
given recovery method provides. Our second hypothesis examined whether higher risk numeracy 
abilities could predict a more accurate ranking of the account recovery methods by security 
strength. Presumably, if a user has higher risk numeracy abilities, they are better able to identify 
general risks and will be able to abstract recovery method information that implies lower account 
security. We did not find evidence to support our second hypothesis, and results suggested that 
risk numeracy aptitude neither benefits nor harms the user’s ability to determine the security 
strength provided by account recovery authentication methods. 
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Furthermore, we found that there was not a relation between the participant’s tau 
correlation coefficient and their overall authentication knowledge score. These results suggested 
that neither high-risk numeracy abilities nor knowing basic authentication practices improve 
user’s diagnostic ability to determine which recovery methods are comparatively safer. This 
information can be important to designers and system administrators when creating training or 
when selecting and implementing these account recovery methods.  
Our hypotheses examined whether gender or having prior cybersecurity training would 
impact overall authentication knowledge scores. When considering gender’s impact on 
authentication concept- and threat- knowledge, we found females had more overall 
authentication knowledge than males. This result is the reverse of our proposed hypothesis and 
does not concur with Cain et al. (2018), finding that males have more knowledge than females. A 
caveat is that their study used a wider range of cyber hygiene knowledge questions beyond 
authentication. Additionally, we found that there was a sample size disparity across the gender 
groups (e.g., males = 30, females = 73), which might have contributed to our inverse findings for 
this analysis.  
When considering cybersecurity training, we found that 20% of participants indicated 
they had either received cybersecurity training, take a class covering cybersecurity topics, or 
identified as a cybersecurity expert. This proportion is similar to the findings of Aytes and 
Conolly’s (2003) research, which reported that 19% of their college-age student sample self-
identified as being cybersecurity trained. However, it is much lower than more current research 
by Cain et al. (2018) that reported 81% of participants had received some form of cybersecurity 
training and the National Cyber Security Alliance (2010), who found 43% of adults had received 
training. Specifically, our hypothesis proposed that prior cybersecurity training will not 
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significantly impact the participant’s authentication knowledge. We found evidence to support 
this hypothesis. Our findings agreed with Cain et al. (2018) previous claims that training did not 
impact users’ cyber hygiene behaviors or knowledge. Another exploratory analysis also 
suggested cybersecurity training experience does not affect a participant’s ability to rank the 
methods by security strength correctly.  
We explored whether having previous experience with 2FA or 2FA account recovery 
would influence which recovery method users select as the safest. Our results suggested that 
neither type of previous 2FA experience impacted which method was perceived as the safest.  
 
5.2 Data Patterns 
The priority with any type of authentication is account security, but usability problems are very 
common with security-related software (Garfinkel & Lipford, 2014; Schultz, Proctor, Lein, & 
Salvendy, 2001). In general, users want to use a system to accomplish their goals, and 
authentication is not typically the primary task on which a user wants to spend effort and time 
(Garfinkel & Lipford, 2014). Colnago et al. (2018) pointed out that users will have an even lower 
tolerance when authentication security protocols distract or prevent users from completing their 
primary task. 2FA and 2FA account recovery are unique because they require additional steps 
and physical artifacts in order for an authorized user to access their account. The following 
discussion section acknowledges potential factors and situations that would moderate the use of 
2FA devices and 2FA account recovery methods to regain account access. Additionally, we use 
participant demographics, perceptions, and open-ended preference responses to consider the 
other expectations and reservations users have regarding the recovery authentication methods.  
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Pragmatically, there are two ways a user could regain account access if a user’s primary 
2FA device becomes inaccessible. (1) The user can either enroll more than one type of 2FA 
device to their account or (2) they can set up an account recovery method. A caveat is that both 
options require that the user set up their account to accept these supplementary authentication 
options prior to an event where their primary 2FA device is unavailable. However, both options 
possess usability shortcomings that merit further examination.  
Systems implementing 2FA give users the option to enroll as many 2FA devices to their 
accounts as they desire. However, we found that 60% of participants indicated they typically 
have only one 2FA device enrolled per personal account (M = 1.58, Md = 1.00, SD = 0.92). This 
finding is aligned with the previous findings of Colnago et al. (2018), which suggests users use 
an average of 1.3 (Md = 1.00) 2FA devices. This suggests most users would not have the option 
to instruct the system to use a different 2FA device to gain account access in the event the user’s 
primary 2FA device becomes unavailable. Potentially, designers can encourage users to enroll 
more than one 2FA device. Still, it is necessary to determine if having more than one 2FA device 
enrolled supports prompt account access. Let us consider the user that is conscientious and 
enrolls more than one 2FA device. For example, a user can set up their account’s 2FA to verify 
their identity via a primary mobile app or a secondary physical hardware key. When the primary 
device is unavailable, they can simply prompt the system to send the code to their secondary 
device. However, for their secondary device to be useful, it must be immediately available. 
Another plausible scenario is a user that has enrolled 2FA -SMS text and -mobile app; both are 
presumably received on the same phone. If the phone itself becomes inaccessible, both enrolled 
options are rendered useless. Correspondently, we found that 81% of participants used a mobile 
or tablet app as their 2FA device, and 51% indicated that they received an SMS text message. 
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Only 10% of participants stated that they used either a hardware or a software device, and only 
8% used a USB security key (see Figure 4). Colnago et al. (2018) found that as the frequency of 
experiencing 2FA problems increases (e.g., forgetting one’s second factor), user’s perceptions 
are negatively impacted, as well as, the usability and security constructs. Future training material 
should consider ways to convince users that it is necessary to enroll additional 2FA devices, 
other than just their phone. Upon closer inspection of these 2FA device scenarios, it is evident 
that there is a security and usability tradeoff when using 2FA. Essentially, account security is 
increased when the user opts into 2FA (McCandless, 2019). However, all 2FA devices are 
physical objects, and the user needs to physically have immediate access to all of the enrolled 
2FA devices to safeguard immediate account access in all potential circumstances. In the 
unfortunate event, a user’s primary 2FA device is not accessible, and the secondary 2FA device 
is also not readily available, account access remains problematic. 
Alternatively, a website can also offer 2FA account recovery methods to allow 
participants to safeguard immediate account access. We found that 39 participants had 
previously used some type of account recovery wherein the majority, 56%, were familiar with 
using a secondary email as a means to regain account access. Our study proposed that fallback 
phone numbers and generated account recovery codes are the most secure methods to offer. We 
also found that the majority of participants perceived these two methods as being safest, 39% for 
recovery codes, and 25% for the fallback phone number. However, both the fallback phone 
number and generated recovery codes options require users to have access to additional physical 
resources to obtain the account recovery verification information. For example, to use the system 
generated recovery codes method, users would have to physically locate the codes if they were 
printed, find them on a device if they were stored electronically, or recall a code from memory. 
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Similarly, the fallback phone number method would require users to either remember the 
emergency contact’s phone number or have a way to obtain their phone number, and they must 
get in contact with them to receive the code.  
Nevertheless, the majority of participants, 38%, perceived the fallback phone as the 
easiest recovery method to use. Additionally, we found that that 45% of participants indicated 
they would prefer using the fallback phone number for account recovery. However, 18% of the 
responses suggested users might disregard the fallback phone number setup instructions by using 
their phone number instead of an emergency contact. Conversely, 1% understood the fallback 
phone number instructions and noted that a potential method weakness was, “…most people 
would likely use their own phone number which goes against the directions…”. Presumably, if 
the users' primary 2FA device is the app, and they initiate the fallback phone number or account 
recovery codes method, it is likely the case their phone itself is unavailable. Thus, if the user 
provides their number or stores the generated recovery codes on only their phone, and the phone 
itself becomes unavailable, these account recovery methods cannot be executed and are no 
longer useful. Future research should evaluate how users will go about setting up a fallback 
phone number or recovery codes method. 
Additionally, researchers should determine how users obtain their emergency contact 
number or retrieve their electronically stored generated recovery codes. Will users often have 
emergency numbers committed to memory? Or will they rely on accessing their electronic files 
such as a phonebook, recovery code images, or codes stored as encrypted documents? If so, how 
will they access the files?  
In addition to recovery security and usability aspects, memorability is also an especially 
important factor that must be considered when selecting an account recovery method. Most 
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likely, users will need to remember their recovery method information after a significantly 
delayed amount of time. This infers that for a recovery method to be usable, it needs to provide 
the user with account accessibility (Still et al., 2017). If an account recovery method that is not 
memorable is implemented, the user’s experience and the usability of the 2FA recovery process 
will be negatively impacted. Our research found that 46% of participants ranked the fallback 
phone number method as most memorable when asked to rank the methods by perceived 
memorability. Additionally, we found that 20% of the participant responses touched on the 
memorability aspect of the recovery methods. Specifically, each method received seven 
responses indicating that the given method seemed easy to remember, 13%, and 3 to 5 responses 
that suggested it was difficult to remember, 7%.  
Al Ameen (2016) noted that the cognitive abilities for both encoding and retrieval stages 
of memory are leveraged when users can view targets. However, the fallback phone number and 
recovery codes methods take a form that is more like a strong traditional alphanumeric password 
because they require a user to provide a code without any system aids. This suggests these 
recovery methods rely on a pure-recall process, which is analogous to asking a user to complete 
an essay exam question by pulling the correct information from memory (Tulving & Watkins, 
1973). On the other hand, adopting recovery methods like the color gird pattern or a graphical 
passcode scheme could provide cognitive benefits that are analogous to asking users to select the 
correct answer from a set of multiple-choice answers (Tulving & Watkins, 1973). Presumably, 
recovery methods like these take advantage of the humans’ affinity for encoding and recognizing 
visual objects (e.g., picture superiority effect; Paivio, 2013). Paivio’s (2013) research states that 
unlike letters and numbers, images are encoded both visually and semantically into long-term 
memory. Studies conducted by Cain and Still (2018) and Chiassion, Forget, Stobert, Van 
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Oorschot, and Biddle (2009) suggest graphical passcodes have superior retention to 
alphanumeric and PIN-based authentication. Cain and Still (2018) reported that 100% of 
participants could not recall their strong system-assigned password after a three-week delay. We 
found that 13% of the 69 participant responses for the graphical passcodes and color grid 
methods mentioned that they preferred the method because they had a visual processing 
preference, and the method was either aesthetically pleasing or they perceive themselves as 
visual learners. Tentatively, both the color grid pattern and a graphical passcode scheme are good 
candidates for memorable account recovery options, but they are not as familiar as the 
alternatives.  
 
5.2 Limitations  
There are limitations to this exploratory study. First, it is important to note that participants were 
asked to self-report their cybersecurity training experiences (e.g., past training, cybersecurity 
expert, or taken courses covering cybersecurity topics). Unfortunately, this does not provide 
insight into the topics that participants were training on, and it is unclear whether those topics 
included authentication material. Participants may have lacked the depth of knowledge required 
to make informed authentication decisions. This would include knowledge about attack vectors 
and cyber hygiene best practices. Future research should aim to evaluate what topics are being 
covered by cybersecurity training material, and the effectiveness of these lessons. Additionally, 
this research did not inquire about how participants were gauging the security associated with a 
given recovery method. Conceivably, participants might have been deploying a different 
heuristic to gauge the security strength of the recovery methods and may not have been explicitly 
considering properties that indicate secure authentication. Future research should evaluate the 
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cognitive processes that users employ when comparing the account security strength of different 
authentication or recovery methods. 
This study attempted to objectively rank the recovery methods by security strength using 
Renaud’s (2007) opportunistic score. Specifically, a small group of research assistants 
independently evaluated each recovery method using the opportunistic score template. However, 
ranking discrepancies were found among the raters, which led us to use the average opportunistic 
score for each method to establish our final objective ranking of the recovery methods by 
security (see Table 3). These scoring discrepancies are potentially a limitation to this study. 
However, the researchers did observe ways to improve the opportunistic scoring template. For 
example, a more detailed explanation about the math required for calculating the guessability 
associated with a given method is needed. Additionally, we detected that some of the questions 
needed the rater to subjectively score methods. For example, it is the rater’s opinion on whether 
they think they can observe and recall a full key (e.g., recovery code or graphical passcode 
images or color pattern) after one viewing, multiple viewings, or it cannot be observed (see 
Appendix C – Observability a). For the graphical recovery methods, the researchers struggled 
with distinguishing between what constitutes a distractor image versus a background image (see 
Appendix C – Analyzability g & h). We found that researchers had different interpretations 
regarding how generated recovery codes would be stored by users and observed by attackers 
which resulted in recordability and observability scoring discrepancies. For example, most 
websites note that each recovery code from the set can only be used once, which suggests 
observing or recoding the user type in that one code would be invaluable to an attacker. 
However, if the rater considered that attacker observed or recorded the whole list of recovery 
codes, they scored the method differently. This suggests further research is needed to evaluate 
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the reliability and validity of Renaud’s (2007) opportunistic score. We needed the opportunistic 
score for determining our ranking of the authentication methods, and we believe others like 
system administrators will find the tool useful as well. However, future research should attempt 
to improve the approach to overcome the identified issues. 





This is the first study to consider potential account recovery method solutions for systems that 
implement 2FA. We found that some people are using 2FA and may not even be aware they are 
using it. Shockingly, only 40% of users have more than one 2FA device enrolled per personal 
account. Additionally, the majority of the users sampled opt to use 2FA devices that are executed 
using their phone, 81% use a mobile app, and 51% receive an SMS text message. This suggests 
regaining account access could be challenging for users in situations when their primary 2FA 
device is unavailable, especially if their phone itself becomes unavailable. Ultimately, user’s 
perceptions, as well as, the system’s security- and usability- constructs will decrease, as the 
frequency of 2FA problem that prevents users from accessing their accounts increase (e.g., a 
broken phone; Colnago et al., 2018). As more systems begin to adopt 2FA, instances that 
necessitate account recovery will become more prevalent. If companies do not adequately 
prepare for such occurrences, it could be costly and increase the overhead for their information 
technology departments. Currently, some companies with 2FA warning users that account 
recovery could take as long as several business days (Afonin, 2016; Coinbase Support – Account 
Management, n.d.; Ravenscraft, 2014). If organization employees experience this account access 
delay, it could be disruptive and prevent them from accessing the services they need to complete 
their work. Other companies like Reddit, Github, and Google are currently offering 
precautionary account recovery options (Loveless, 2018; Prins, 2018; Wallen, 2018). Essentially, 
these organizations deploy 2FA and offer users an account recovery authentication option that 
can be set up prior to losing a second-factor device. We found that 56% of participants who 
indicated they had experienced setting up a 2FA account recovery method were most familiar 
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with a secondary email address method. Presumably, account recovery occurs intermittently; 
therefore, it is critical for memorability to be an inherent feature of the recovery method being 
implemented, or the method will be rendered useless. A common pattern across memorability 
studies suggests that graphical authentication schemes that allow users to recognize their 
passcode elicit better memory (Cain & Still, 2018; Wiedenbeck et al., 2006). This research 
considered users’ perceived security, usability, memorability, and preference for a graphical 
passcode-, a user created color grid pattern-, generated recovery codes-, and a fallback phone 
number- 2FA account recovery methods.  
Account security is always a priority when selecting a 2FA account recovery method. 
This study used Renaud’s (2007) opportunistic equation to objectively rank the recovery 
methods by security strength. We established that a fallback phone number recovery method 
provides user accounts with the most security followed by system-generated recovery codes, a 
color grid pattern, and a graphical passcode. Our research provided users with recovery method 
descriptions that hinted at the method’s account security strengths and weaknesses. We asked 
participants to subjectively rank the recovery methods by security strength. This allowed us to 
indirectly measure whether or not participants have knowledge about the different authentication 
attack vectors. We found that participants performed poorly on this task. Further, we investigated 
three individual difference variables that might impact performance on this task.  
Previous research suggests that user’s ability to accurately interpret and act on risk 
information can be revealed by their statistical risk numeracy abilities (Cokely et al., 2012; 2014; 
Petrova et al., 2019; Schwartz et al., 1997). This study deployed the BNT test to capture the 
participant’s general risk understanding (Cokely et al., 2012; Schwartz et al., 1997). We found 
variability among participant scores, but on average, scores suggested low to moderate numeracy 
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abilities. On the other hand, we found that participants exhibited high concept- and threat- 
authentication knowledge and, presumably, this should have aided in their ability to evaluate the 
security of a given recovery method. We also inquired about participant’s exposure to 
cybersecurity educational material through previous training, a course covering cybersecurity 
topics, or if they considered themselves an expert. Surprisingly, we found that these individual 
difference variables of risk numeracy aptitude, authentication knowledge, and cybersecurity 
familiarity had no impact on participants' ability to correctly rank the recovery methods by 
security strength.  
Even though our results suggested that cybersecurity training did not impact user’s 
security ranking abilities or authentication knowledge, it is important to highlight that 80% of 
participants indicated that they had no prior experience with formal cybersecurity training 
material. Also, our ability to further examine the other 20% of participants that were familiar 
with cybersecurity material was limited because we did not inquire about the topics that they had 
been exposed to nor the breadth of their training. Presumably, participant’s poor ranking abilities 
might indirectly suggest that they lack a deeper understanding of the different authentication 
attack vectors, despite their moderate general authentication knowledge. Or users were possibly 
applying other usability heuristics to determine recovery method security strength.  
The findings that the aforementioned individual differences do not impact user’s security 
diagnostic abilities and the other insights provide useful guidance for communicating recovery 
method security information. From a practitioner’s perspective, we propose the following list of 
recommendations. First, companies that use 2FA should encourage users to enroll at least two 
different types of 2FA devices (e.g., a mobile app and a USB key). Companies should also 
provide users with the option to set up an account recovery method to circumvent problems that 
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may otherwise prevent users from accessing their accounts. We recommend that companies 
educate users about recovery options by considering the best practices for communicating 
recovery method security information to promote informed judgment. For example, if the 
company wants to deploy the fallback phone number recovery option, we recommend for their 
goal to focus on drawing users away from using their phone number (e.g., offer narratives 
highlighting negative use cases). This aligns with previous research, which suggests that a 
company’s communication should focus on leading the user away from making a risky security 
decision when they want to avoid user issues (Nurse et al., 2011). Lastly, we found that risk 
literacy abilities do not benefit nor harm a user’s appraisal of recovery method security. We are 
not aware of any companies that provide users with representative authentication security 
information. We recommend companies be more transparent by providing users with this 
information using a visual (Cokely et al., 2018; Nurse et al., 2011). For instance, they could 
provide a comparison depicting the probabilities of a successful attack occurring when using the 
given recovery methods. Providing users with this explicit security information will aid the user 
in making a more informed judgment. 
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APPENDIX A: STUDY SURVEY 
Section 1: Demographics  
1. What is your age? _____ 
2. What is your gender?  
a. Female 
b. Male 
3. Are you colorblind? 
a. Yes 
b. No 




5. What is your declared college major? _____ 
6. Have you been trained in cyber security in the past?  
a. Yes  
b. No 
7. If you have received training in cyber security, where did this training take place? Check 




d. Other ___________ 
e. N/A 
8. Have you taken classes covering the topic of cyber security in the past? 
a. Yes  
b. No  
9. Do you consider yourself an expert in cyber security? 
a. Yes  
b. No 
10. Have you ever been the target of a cybersecurity attack in the past? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
11. What type of electronics do you typically use? Check all that apply 
a. Desktop 
b. Laptop 
c. Smart Phone 
d. Tablet 
e. Smart Watch 
f. Other _________ 
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12. On average, how many hours do you spend using technology a day? 
13. Is your heart beating? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
14. Do you currently use two-factor authentication (2FA) to protect any of your personal 
accounts?  
a. Yes  
b. No 
If yes, answer the following 3 questions: 
15. Which 2FA devices have you used for your personal accounts? Select all that apply.  
a. SMS text messaging  
b. Smartphone or tablet App (ex. Duo Mobile)  
c. Hardware token (a small physical token, requires you push a button to receive a 
one-time 6- or 8- digit OATH-HOTP passcode)  
d. Software token (software that has been downloaded onto your computer that use 
TOTP or HOTP authentication to generate a one-time passcode) 
e. Security Key (aka. U2F token) (ex. YubiKey) 
f. Other ________________ 





e. 5 or more 
17. Have you ever been asked to setup a 2FA account recovery option, for cases such as a 
lost or stolen second factor?  
a. Yes   What type of recovery method was setup? ___________________ 
b. No 
Section 2: Knowledge of Authentication Concepts (bolded answers indicate correct responses) 





2. What are over the shoulder attacks/ shoulder surfing?  
a. When a person attacks from over the shoulder and steals their device 
b. When a person watches the user type in their login information and 
password, in order to gain access to their accounts 
c. When a hacker in a public place infects the user’s computer with a virus without 
making physical contact, just standing over their shoulder 
d. When a hacker overrides the user’s antivirus software and gains access to their 
account 
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3. What is authentication?  
a. The process of verifying the identity of the user  
b. The act of protecting a user’s identity  
c. Having multiple accounts with the same password  
d. Assigning the user a unique user name 
4. We care about data quality. To ensure you are currently paying attention can you please 





Section 3: Knowledge of Threats (bolded answers indicate correct responses)  
1. Posting personal information on social media can be dangerous 
a. Strongly Disagree  
b. Disagree  
c. Neither Agree nor Disagree  
d. Agree  
e. Strongly Agree 
2. It is safe to share a password with others  
a. Strongly Disagree  
b. Disagree  
c. Neither Agree nor Disagree  
d. Agree  
e. Strongly Agree 
3. Use of a strong password can decrease the user’s vulnerability to an attack 
a. Strongly Disagree  
b. Disagree  
c. Neither Agree nor Disagree  
d. Agree  
e. Strongly Agree 
4. Using the same passwords on multiple websites decreases the user’s vulnerability to an 
attack 
a. Strongly Disagree  
b. Disagree  
c. Neither Agree nor Disagree  
d. Agree  
e. Strongly Agree 
5. It is not important to password protect your mobile device 
a. Strongly Disagree  
b. Disagree  
c. Neither Agree nor Disagree  
d. Agree  
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e. Strongly Agree 
6. Respond with “Strongly Agree” to this question  
a. Strongly Disagree  
b. Disagree  
c. Neither Agree nor Disagree  
d. Agree  
e. Strongly Agree 
7. Error messages provided by the website during authentication can prove to be valuable 
clues to an attacker 
a. Strongly Disagree  
b. Disagree  
c. Neither Agree nor Disagree  
d. Agree  
e. Strongly Agree 
 
Section 4: Berlin Numeracy Test 
Instructions: Please answer all the math questions that follow. Do NOT use a calculator but 
feel free to use scratch paper for notes. 
1. Imagine that we flip a fair coin 1,000 times. What is your best guess about how many 
times the coin would come up heads in 1,000 flips? 
2. Imagine we are throwing a five-sided die 50 times. On average, out of these 50 throws 
how many times would this five-sided die show an odd number (1, 3 or 5)?  (____ 
out of 50 throws) 
3. In the BIG BUCKS LOTTERY, the chance of winning a $10 prize is 1%. What is your 
best guess about how many people would win a $10 prize if 1000 people each buy a 
single ticket to BIG BUCKS?  
4. In ACME PUBLISHING SWEEPSTAKES, the chance of winning a car is 1 in 1,000. 
What percent of tickets to ACME PUBLISHING SWEEPSTAKES win a car? (____%) 
5. Out of 1,000 people in a small town 500 are members of a choir. Out of these 500 
members in a choir 100 are men. Out of the 500 inhabitants that are not in a choir 300 are 
men. What is the probability that a randomly drawn man is a member of the choir? 
(____%) 
6. Imagine we are throwing a loaded die (6 sides). The probability that the die shows a 6 is 
twice as high as the probability of each of the other numbers. On average, out of these 70 
throws how many times would the die show the number 6? (____out of 70 throws) 
7. In a forest 20% of mushrooms are red, 50% brown and 30% white. A red mushroom is 
poisonous with a probability of 20%. A mushroom that is not red is poisonous with a 
probability of 5%. What is the probability that a poisonous mushroom in the forest is red? 
(____%) 
 
Correct Answers: 1) 500 or 50% or ½   2) 30 throws   3) 10   4) 0.10%   5) 25%   6) 20 throws   
7) 50% 




Section 5: Account Recovery Method Descriptions 
During the initial setup of two-factor authentication on a personal account, an account recovery 
method can also be setup as a failsafe in the event of a lost or stolen second factor. When this 
type of unexpected event occurs, the user would be required to accurately authenticate using 
their 1st factor alphanumeric password and their account recovery method in order to gain 
account access. The following information provides a short description of four potential account 
recovery options. Please read the account recovery descriptions and answer the following 
questions 




1. Generated Recovery Codes- 
During the initial setup of the user’s account recovery, the system will generate a 
unique set of 8 or more different system-assigned account recovery codes. Each recovery 
code is a 10-character complex string of numbers and letters. Systems often advise the 
user to do the following: remember at least 1 of the codes; save the codes to an offline 
server or to an encrypted file; or print a hardcopy and store in a safe place.  
During account recovery login, the user is asked to correctly input 1 or more of 
the recovery codes they received originally. The figures below depict an example of 
system prompts the user would typically see when setting up or executing account 
recovery using system generated recovery codes. 
 
 
Generated recovery codes the 
user receives when setting up 
their 2FA account recovery 
method. 
A system prompt requesting 
the user to enter one of the 
recovery codes they were 
assigned when initially setting 
up their 2FA account recovery 
method. 
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2. Graphical Scheme Passcode-  
During setup, the system generates a set of 3 picture icons that are assigned to the 
user as their passcode icons. The system prompts the user to remember their icons.  
During account recovery login, the user is asked to recognize and select their 
passcode icons from a set of distractor icons. Note that the order in which participants 
select their icons during login often does not matter.  
The figures below depict Convex Hull Click (CHC) as an example of a graphical 
scheme that can be used for account recovery. The user’s passcode consists of 3 icons.  
During login, the user’s passcode icons always form a triangle shaped selection region on 
the grid. To login successfully, the user must click one time anywhere inside the 
triangular region created by their 3 passcode icons. The same passcode and non-passcode 
icons are shown during each new account recovery session; however, the icons’ location 
on the grid changes to keep their passcode more secure. Users are also instructed not to 
hover the mouse cursor over- nor click directly on- a passcode icon.  
 
 
The triangle created by the 
passcode icons reflects the area 
that can be clicked in order for 
the user to successfully login. 
The CHC interface that the 
user would interact with. 
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3. Fallback Phone Number-  
During the initial setup, the user provides a 10-digit emergency contact phone 
number (e.g., significant other, family member) where a one-time verification code can 
be received. Systems often provide the user with the option to have the code sent to the 
emergency contact via text or phone call. Since a personal cell phone can be used as a 
medium device for 2FA through an app or SMS, systems often advise the user not to 
provide their own phone number. Additionally, systems often advise the user to choose a 
fallback contact phone number that they can recall or obtain without referring to their 
own personal cell phone (e.g., if your phone is lost, your contact list might not be 
available).  
During account recovery login, the system informs the user that a verification 
code was sent to the fallback phone ending in +x xxx xx01, for example. The user is 
required to get in touch with the fallback contact to obtain the code. The system then 
prompts the user to correctly enter the verification code. The figures below depict an 
example of system prompts the user would typically see when setting up or executing 
account recovery using a fallback phone contact verification code.  
 
The system prompt that the 
user receives when setting up a 
fallback phone number contact 
as their 2FA account recovery 
method. 
A system link that 
allows users to send a 
verification code to 
their fallback contact. 
A verification 
code received by 
the fallback 
contact via SMS.  
The system prompt requesting 
the user to enter the 
verification code that was sent 
to the fallback contact phone 
number. 




4. Color Grid –  
During setup, the user is asked to create a color grid pattern that they can 
remember and recreate using 9 squares on a 3x3 grid. To create a pattern, the user 
chooses colors from a system provided color palette. To increase account security, the 
system requires that the user chooses at least two different colors.  
During account recovery login, users are prompted to recreate their color pattern 
on the 9 square grid. The figures below depict an example of the interface the user would 
typically see when setting up or executing account recovery using a color grid pattern.  
     
 
Perception Questions  
1. Rank order the recovery methods from safest (1) to least safe (4) 
 ____ Generated Recovery Codes 
____ Graphical Passcode 
____ Fallback Phone Number  
____ Color Grid Pattern 
2. Rank order the recovery methods from easiest to use (1) to most difficult to use (4) 
 ____ Generated Recovery Codes 
____ Graphical Passcode 
____ Fallback Phone Number  
____ Color Grid Pattern  
3. Rank order the recovery methods from most memorable (1) to least memorable (4) 
 ____ Generated Recovery Codes 
A blank 3x3 grid before the 
user has set up or executed 
their account recovery color 
pattern.  
A color grid after the user has 
set up or executed their pattern 
for account recovery.  
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____ Graphical Passcode 
____ Fallback Phone Number  
____ Color Grid Pattern  
4. It is vital to our research that we only include responses from people that devoted their 
attention to this study. In your honest opinion, should we use your data for this section in 
our analyses? (You will receive credit for this study even if you provide a negative 
response) 
a. Yes  
b. No 
 
Recovery Method Preference 
1. If given the option, which account recovery method would you choose to use? 
a. Generated Recovery Codes 
b. Graphical Passcode 
c. Fallback Phone Number  
d. Color Grid Pattern 
2. Why you would prefer to use this recovery method? Please explain. 
 
Participant Debriefing Statement  
Many companies are implementing Two-Factor Authentication (2FA) to increase the security of 
user accounts. When 2FA issues (e.g., 2nd factor is lost, stolen, or unavailable) prevent an 
authorized user from gaining account access, an alternate account recovery option that does not 
require a downloaded software or registered device should be available. Essentially, an account 
recovery option is an account feature that can be made available to 2FA users and it is set up 
before losing a second-factor device. The purpose of this study is to gain a comprehensive 
understanding of the novice end user’s: general authentication knowledge; behaviors; risk 
literacy abilities; and measure their preference and perceived security of different 2FA account 
recovery methods. Researching account recovery is important because literature has shown that 
current account recovery processes for 2FA can be cumbersome and some companies’ caution 
that it may take several business days for the user to regain account access. We predict the results 
of this study will help us determine which 2FA account recovery methods are preferred, and 
which are perceived as –secure and –memorable. Our goal is to offer the research community a 
comparison of the attributes of the different account recovery methods and provide website 
designers with better direction when selecting prospective account recovery options.  
If you have any questions or comments, feel free to contact the researcher using the contact 
information that is given for this study in the SONA system. We plan to publish the results 
within the next year and they will be available for viewing at 
http://www.psychofdesign.com/publications.htm .   
Thank you for your participation! 
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APPENDIX B: INFORMED CONSENT DOCUMENT 
OLD DOMINION UNIVERSITY 
PROJECT TITLE: Account Recovery for Two-Factor Authentication 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Please take your time in deciding if you would like to participate in this study by reading this 
notice carefully. This page will record your consent to participate in this study, “Account 
Recovery for Two-Factor Authentication,” on Qualtrics through the SONA research system.  
 
DESCRIPTION OF RESEARCH STUDY 
This study aims to gain a comprehensive understanding of the typical knowledge and behaviors 
regarding authentication. We are exploring the idea of two-factor authentication (2FA) account 
recovery methods. An account recovery method is a failsafe for 2FA in the event of a lost or 
unavailable second factor. We want to help to increase the security of user privacy data while still 
allowing the authorized user account access. Our goal is to determine if the typical end-user 
knows the concepts and threats associated with authentication, and to measure security feature 
preference for account recovery.  
 
You will be asked to complete a 42-question survey. The survey is composed mainly of multiple 
questions with only a few fill-in-the-blanks. Math will be required to answer seven of the survey 
questions. For each item you should select the answer(s) that you think is best based on your 
knowledge, experiences, and opinions. The survey should take about 30-45 minutes to complete. 
 




To participate in this study, you must be at least 18 years old and you must have corrected to 
normal vision. 
 
RISKS AND BENEFITS 
RISKS: If you decide to participate in this study, there is a potential risk of eye strain from 
interacting with a computer-based system. This risk is similar to typical computer usage. And, as 
with any research, there is some possibility that you may be subject to risks that have not yet 
been identified. 
 
BENEFITS: There are no immediate benefits to participants for participating in this study. The 
overall benefit will be to help improve authentication systems in terms of usability and security.  
 
COSTS AND PAYMENTS 
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Your decision to participate in this study must be voluntary. And, we recognize that your 
participation, poses some inconveniences. Therefore, you will receive 1 research credit through 
the SONA system for participation.   
 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
The results of the study will not be associated with you in any way. No records are kept that 
allow your name to be associated with your responses in the study or on the survey. Your 
responses will be anonymous. The outcome of this research may be used in reports, 
presentations, and publications. But, again we will not identify you personally. Of course, your 
records may be subpoenaed by court order or inspected by government bodies with oversight 
authority. 
 
WITHDRAWAL PRIVILEGE  
Your participation in this study is completely voluntary and you may refuse to participate. If you 
agree to participate, you have the right to stop at any time or the right to skip any survey question 
that you do not wish to answer.  
 
COMPENSATION FOR ILLNESS AND INJURY 
If you say agree to participate, then your consent does not waive any of your legal rights. 
However, in the event of any harm arising from this study, neither Old Dominion University nor 
the researchers are able to give you any money, insurance coverage, free medical care, or any 
other compensation for such harm.  In the event that you suffer some type of harm as a result of 
participation in any research project, you may contact Dr. Jeremiah Still at 757-683-6424, Dr. 
Tancy Vandecar-Burdin the current IRB chair at 757-683 3802 at Old Dominion University, or 
the Old Dominion University Office of Research at 757-683-3460 who will be glad to review the 
matter with you. 
 
VOLUNTARY CONSENT 
By continuing with the study, you are saying several things. You are saying that you have read 
this information, that you are satisfied that you understand this information, the research study, 
and its risks and benefits. If you have any questions later on, then the researchers should be able 
to answer them: Dr. Jeremiah Still at 757-683-6424. 
 
If at any time you have any questions about your rights, then you should call Dr. Tancy 
Vandecar-Burdin, the current IRB chair, at 757 683 3802, or the Old Dominion University Office 
of Research, at 757 683 3460. 
 
Electronic Consent 
By clicking the “I agree” button you indicate that you meet the study’s requirements and consent 
to the study. You may print a copy of this screen for your records. 
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APPENDIX C: RENAUD’S (2007) OPPORTUNISTIC SCORE SPECIFICATIONS 
Opportunistic Scoring Rubric Given Research Assistant to Assess Account Recovery Methods 
Opportunist 
Category 
Question(s) or Prompt(s) 












Guessability This is the traditional measure of 
strength of an authentication key: 
the size of the dictionary space.  
The guessability of a four-digit PIN 
is 1 in 10,000 since there are 10,000 
four-digit numbers to choose from 
hence any key that is as strong or 
stronger than this is assigned a 0. 
Weaker keys will be assigned a 
proportionally higher guessability 
figure. 
    





Question(s) or Prompt(s) 












Recordability As regards recordability, the 
systems can be assigned values as 
follows: 
- 1 if the code is easily recorded 
- 0.5 if it was harder to record or 
describe, or if recording of the key 
does not provide an observer with 
the full key 
- 0 if it is difficult or impossible to 
record or describe, such as, for 
example, a biometric 
It should be noted that recordability 
is an extremely difficult weakness 
to counteract, mainly due to inbuilt 
operating system features such as 
the “Print Screen” button and 
browser print functionality, which 
allows the user to print the 
authentication screen and mark off 
the required images to offset 
memory lapses. 
    





Question(s) or Prompt(s) 












Observability Observation of the code involves 
two equally important features: 
(a) being able to actually see the 
key on the screen, and to use it—we 
assign: 
- 0.5 if the key can be used if 
observed only once to obtain the 
full key 
- 0.25 if key entry needs to be 
observed multiple times to obtain 
the key  
- 0 if the key cannot be observed 
    
(b) being able to judge the position 
of the key based on where the 
person is pointing at the screen or 
on the keyboard — we assign: 
- 0.5 if observation of the key 
location is meaningful  
- 0 if not 
    





Question(s) or Prompt(s) 












Analyzability (a) Usernames — users should be 
assigned usernames rather than 
email addresses because email 
addresses are too easily obtainable 
and make it easier for hackers to 
gain access to the system — we 
assign:  
- 1 if the system uses email 
addresses as usernames  
- 0 if unique usernames are used 
and not visible to other users. 
0 0 0 0 





Question(s) or Prompt(s) 












Analyzability (b) Error messages — error 
messages need to be provided on 
various levels. The developer 
obviously needs a different kind of 
error message that will enable 
him/her to analyze problems with 
the web site. Once the site is 
deployed, however, the messages 
should become targeted at the needs 
of the user, and no longer inform as 
to actual failure codes or database 
errors, but rather in terms of actions 
the user needs to take to recover. 
This limits the usefulness of error 
messages to the potential intruder. 
Hence — we assign:   
- 0 if error messages have been 
tailored in this way  
- 1 otherwise. 
0 0 0 0 
 (c) Default Keys — this particularly 
bad practice earns a rating of 1 
because many users will not 
redefine their key or an intruder can 
take advantage of the default setting 
before the user logs in for the first 
time. 
0 0 0 0 





Question(s) or Prompt(s) 












Analyzability (d) Forced changes — the reasoning 
behind this is that a leaked 
authentication key will only be 
useful to an intruder for a limited 
period of time. However, routine 
forced renewals actually decrease 
guessability since users need to 
come up with new passwords every 
time it is renewed, and they 
eventually start choosing easy-to-
remember passwords. Hence an 
application with this policy earns a 
1. 
0 0 0 0 





Question(s) or Prompt(s) 












Analyzability (e) Key retrieval — Forgotten keys 
should never be emailed. This is 
simply too easy for an intruder to 
intercept. The current practice of 
asking the user to confirm the 
answer to a particular question 
reduces the authentication key space 
to a very small space indeed and 
one that can probably be uncovered 
by a research-based attack. A better 
mechanism is to reset the password 
and email the user a secure link, 
which requires the user to set a new 
password. For a secure site a more 
secure option may be required, such 
as, perhaps, sending an SMS 
message to the user and requiring 
her to confirm the request via SMS 
before the secure link is emailed. A 
policy that emails authentication 
keys or uses confirmation questions 
to confirm identity earns a 1 for 
analyzability. 
0 0 0 0 





Question(s) or Prompt(s) 












Analyzability (f) Backward browsing—intruders 
can often try to obtain information 
by using the back button, which is 
impossible to disable. Hence, we 
will assign 0 only if the system 
ensures that authentication pages 
expire immediately after they are 
processed. A weakness of 1 will be 
assigned otherwise. 
0 0 0 0 





Question(s) or Prompt(s) 












Analyzability (g) Choice of distractor images (if 
applicable) — some recognition-
based authentication mechanisms 
rely on the user choosing one image 
from a group of distractor images. If 
distractor images are varied at each 
attempt it is a simple matter for the 
intruder to observe the interaction 
over an extended period of time to 
identify the target images, or to 
refresh the display repeatedly. It is 
more secure to fix distractors for a 
particular user and to use these 
repeatedly. — we assign: 
-  0 if the scheme follows the 
aforementioned policy  
- 1 if there is a policy of varying 
distractors  


















“   ” 
 
______ 
“   ” 
 
_____ 
“   ” 





Question(s) or Prompt(s) 












Analyzability (h) Choice of background image (if 
applicable) — some mechanisms 
make use of a single large image, 
which needs to have particular 
characteristics: 
In this case the image needs to have 
many features which can be chosen 
by the user, but not too many, 
which could cause confusion. 
Hence — we assign: 
- 1 to an image with fewer than 10 
identifiable features  
- 0 to an image with more than 1000 
features (Numbers in between are 
assigned on a proportional basis) 
- NA if choice of background image 


















“   ” 
 
______ 
“   ” 
 
_____ 
“   ” 
Resistibility (a) Lockout policy (i.e. only allows 
a set amount of login attempts)— 
we assign:  
- 1 if there is a strikeout policy  
- 0 otherwise 
1 1 1 1 





Question(s) or Prompt(s) 












Resistibility (b) Key Strength — stronger keys 
are less prone to brute-force attacks 
so many systems enforce password 
policies that require passwords to 
have a specific length, a digit, 
upper- and lower-case letters and 
special characters. Unfortunately, 
people cannot remember long and 
complicated strings and this 
increases the likelihood that it will 
be recorded. A much better way of 
strengthening a key is by using 
length rather than complication. For 
example, password users can be 
encouraged to write a whole 
sentence rather than a simple word. 
— we assign:  
- 0 if a key complicating policy is 
applied 
- 1 if a key lengthening policy is 
applied  















“   ” 
 
______ 
“   ” 
 
_____ 
“   ” 





Question(s) or Prompt(s) 












Resistibility (c) Timeouts—If an authentication 
takes too long it is likely that an 
intruder is trying to determine 
which the target images are by 
doing some kind of research. The 
legitimate user can be expected to 
home in on her images very 
quickly. Hence a time limit should 
be applied to the authentication 
step. — we assign: 
- 1 if there is a policy  
- 0 otherwise 
1 1 1 1 
 (d) Auditing (i.e., System 
administrators spend time scanning 
the information logs of the 
authentication mechanism to check 
for hacker activity) — we assign:  
- 0 if no regular auditing takes place  
- 1 if auditing takes place at weekly 
intervals  
- 2 if it occurs more often than that 
2 2 2 2 





Question(s) or Prompt(s) 












Resistibility (e) Evidence— we assign:  
- 1 if previous login attempts are 
displayed to the user at login time 
- 2 if the user is apprised by email 
or SMS when someone logs into 
their account 
- 0 if no historical data is provided 
2 2 2 2 
 (f) Ease of change — if you make it 
easy for users to change their 
authentication keys, they are more 
likely to do so. Hence — we assign:  
- 1 if this is easy to do, but only if 
they have to authenticate 
themselves before changing it. 
1 1 1 1 
Total Opportunistic Score      
Note. All questions and prompts were directly quoted from Renaud (2007). The bolded scores 
reflect the assigned scores that suggested the system was implementing the best attack resistant 
strategy for the prompts that regarded the authentication security protocol of the system itself. 
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